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Introduction
Torture. Incest. Abortion. Honesty. The list of things that evoke our moral intuitions
seems endless. Many, like incest, seem obviously wrong to all of us. And surely honesty, in
general, is good. But people have diverging intuitions about torture and abortion. Our various
moral intuitions are an important part of our everyday experience. We form moral intuitions
when we read the news, watch our favorite television program or movie, and interact with, or
even just observe those around us. These moral intuitions seem to occur without warning,
without reflection, and without our control; yet we generally trust their accuracy without
question. We have the strong impression that our moral intuitions track the moral truth, even
though they often conflict with the intuitions of other people.
But what is the proper epistemic role of such moral intuitions? Are they justified? Ought
we accept our intuitions so easily, or at all? One answer is given by the thesis of moral
intuitionism (intuitionism, for short), which is a version of foundationalism in moral
epistemology. Intuitionism holds that some moral intuitions, qua moral beliefs, are justified noninferentially; that is, “some believers are justified in holding some moral beliefs independently of
whether the believer is able to infer those moral beliefs from any other beliefs” (SinnottArmstrong 2006a, 185). The intuitionist believes that moral intuitions provide the foundation for
moral knowledge, the bedrock from which other moral beliefs can be justified.
This thesis has recently come under fire by what I will call “the argument from cognitive
biases” put forth by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, who wields evidence of cognitive biases of moral
intuitions against the intuitionist (2006a; 2006b; 2008a; 2008b). A cognitive bias occurs when a
cognitive process (like making a decision or forming a judgment, belief, or intuition) is affected
by purportedly irrelevant properties of the situation being judged. For example, framing effects
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are one type of cognitive bias whereby “decision makers respond differently to different but
objectively equivalent descriptions of the same problem”—just changing the wording of a
question, without changing the content of the question itself, can make a person form different
beliefs, and respond differently (Levin et al. 1998, 150). When a cognitive process is biased in
this way, it is not reliable. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, this “follows from the very idea of
cognitive biases” (2008a, 52). Sinnott-Armstrong argues that since many moral intuitions are
highly susceptible to cognitive biases, moral intuitions are unreliable. Some moral intuitions or
types of moral intuitions may be reliable, even though moral intuitions in general are unreliable
(just as some Fords may start reliably, even though Fords in general may be unreliable if many
do not start reliably). But for Sinnott-Armstrong, if a class of intuitions is unreliable, then one is
justified in accepting a given intuition from that class just in case she can confirm the intuition.
Imagine that our intuitions about Fords starting are unreliable—perhaps we are often convinced
by Ford’s advertisements that their cars will start, when in fact they often do not. If we ought to
know that these intuitions are unreliable, Sinnott-Armstrong would suggest that one is justified in
her intuition that a given Ford will start just in case she can confirm that intuition. That is, in case
she can confirm that the Ford will start, perhaps by providing evidence that she has started it
many times before without incident. And confirmation of an intuition justifies the intuition
inferentially; her intuition is justified because can infer the belief that the Ford will start from the
evidence that she has started it many times before. Since confirmation of an intuition justifies the
intuition by making a person able to infer the intuition from the confirming evidence,
confirmation provides inferential justification (see Section 2.1). Thus, the argument from
cognitive biases goes, since moral intuitions are unreliable and accordingly require moral
confirmation (i.e. confirmation of the moral intuitions) to be justified, they cannot be non-
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inferentially justified. Therefore, intuitionism, which holds that some moral intuitions are
justified non-inferentially, is false.
The argument from cognitive biases is a recent line of argument against intuitionism, and
moral intuitionists have yet to offer an adequate reply. In this thesis I will not aim to defend
moral intuitionism against rival moral epistemological theories; rather, I aim only to point out
that the argument from cognitive biases involves a hidden premise, which is false. There may be
good reasons to reject intuitionism, but the argument from cognitive biases is not one of them,
and I will attempt to show why here. I will resurrect an intuitionist response to an old argument
against intuitionism, the argument from disagreement, and adapt that response to the argument
from cognitive biases (Mackie 1977; Loeb 1998; Sinnott-Armstrong 2002, 2006a, 2006b). I will
show that the argument from cognitive biases requires the plausibly false premise which states
that the cognitive biases (and unreliability) of moral intuitions are not grounded in cognitive
biases (and unreliability) of non-moral judgments. By non-moral judgments, I mean people’s
relevant perceptions or representations of the non-moral facts of the situation—which can be
conscious or represented in subconscious processes. They are relevant in that they are about the
non-moral facts that affect the formation of moral intuitions about the situation (like judgments
about future consequences). Biases of these non-moral judgments may be caused by subtle
changes in the salience of certain non-moral facts, which the subject is not even aware of. Also,
biases of non-moral judgments may be short lived and easily changed (e.g. when the subject
focuses her attention on different information).
I will suggest that cognitive biases, like framing effects, influence people’s moral
intuitions largely because they influence such non-moral judgments; that is, framing effects
influence people’s judgments about the non-moral facts of the case. The idea is that most
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differences in a subject’s moral intuitions about different, but objectively equivalent
presentations of the same situation are due to differences in her non-moral judgments about the
different presentations of the situation. And as Sinnott-Armstrong notes in the context of the
argument from disagreement, “when disagreements about moral issues arise solely from nonmoral disagreements and conceptual confusions that could be removed by further inquiry and
reflection, informed and rational people would not disagree” (2006a, 199). This same principle
applies to the argument from cognitive biases, in that when differences in a person’s moral
intuitions are grounded in differences in her non-moral judgments, resolving the difference in
non-moral judgments would resolve the difference in moral intuitions (i.e. would remove the
cognitive biases of moral intuitions). In this case, moral confirmation is not required for one’s
moral intuitions to be justified. Since non-moral confirmation removes the biases of moral
intuitions, such non-moral confirmation can allow one’s moral intuitions to be justified. And,
unlike moral confirmation, non-moral confirmation does not threaten intuitionism because one
cannot infer her moral intuitions from non-moral confirmation (on pain of inferring an ought
from an is). Thus, if the cognitive biases and unreliability of moral intuitions are grounded in
cognitive biases and unreliability of non-moral judgments, then the biases of moral intuitions can
be eliminated and the original reason for thinking those intuitions were unreliable is gone.
Accordingly, by confirming the relevant non-moral judgments, our moral intuitions could be
justified without making those intuitions inferable. Thus, our moral intuitions can be justified
non-inferentially (barring some reason other than cognitive biases to question their reliability).
The argument from cognitive biases does not threaten the moral intuitionist who claims that
moral intuitions can be justified non-inferentially when biases of non-moral judgments do not
occur.
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The empirical research cited by the argument from cognitive biases to show that moral
intuitions are unreliable leaves open the possibility that the biases of moral intuitions are
grounded in biases of subjects’ non-moral judgments. And I will argue that, to a significant
extent, this is the case—many biases of moral intuitions are grounded in biases of non-moral
judgments. I will also present a study I conducted in collaboration with Eddy Nahmias that
supports my claim.
In Section 1, I will motivate the topic by introducing the thesis of intuitionism. Then, in
Section 2, I will review the argument from cognitive biases. In Section 3, I will show how it
parallels the argument from disagreement against intuitionism, and highlight the intuitionist’s
response from the non-moral basis of disagreement, which holds that many moral disagreements
are grounded in non-moral disagreements. Then, in Section 4, I adapt the intuitionist’s response
from the non-moral basis of disagreement to respond to the argument from cognitive biases—
offering a response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases of moral intuitions. In Section
5, I will discuss an empirical study Eddy Nahmias and I conducted that weighs in favor of my
response. I offer some concluding remarks in Section 6.
1 Skepticism and intuitionism
Moral epistemology is the branch of metaethics that studies moral knowledge, beliefs,
and justification. The central problems facing the moral epistemologist are whether and how
moral claims can be known and moral beliefs can be justified. For our discussion of intuitionism,
issues about the justification of moral beliefs will be central, so we will forgo a discussion of
moral knowledge. In a recent paper, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explained justification of moral
beliefs quite simply: a moral belief is justified when “the believer ought to hold that belief as
opposed to suspending belief, because the believer has adequate epistemic grounds for believing
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that it is true” (2008a, 48). 1 Much of the difficulty comes in specifying what epistemic grounds
count as “adequate”. But intuitionism is a thesis designed to respond to a more fundamental
problem with the justification of moral beliefs raised by the skeptic: perhaps no moral belief is
ever justified because of a vicious skeptical regress. The skeptical regress gets started by
assuming that the justification of moral beliefs must be inferential:
Inferential justification—S is inferentially justified in believing B
if, in order to be justified in believing B, S must be able to infer B
from another justified belief, B`. 2
The problem here is that if justification must be inferential, then S can only be justified in
believing B`, the belief which justifies her belief in B, if S has the ability to infer B` from another
justified belief, B``. And S must be able to infer B`` from another justified belief B```, and so on.
In this way, on the assumption that moral beliefs can only be justified inferentially, the
justification of moral beliefs falls into a vicious regress.
The moral intuitionist’s answer to this regress is, as Sinnott-Armstrong aptly puts it,
“simply to stop” (2006a, 184). Intuitionism flatly rejects the assumption that moral beliefs can
only be justified inferentially, and thus holds that at least some moral beliefs can be justified
non-inferentially:
Non-inferential justification—S is non-inferentially justified in
believing B if, in order to be justified in believing B, S does not
need to be able to infer B from any other belief.
Although S might have the ability to infer B from B`, S is non-inferentially justified in believing
B when she is justified independently of her ability to infer B from other beliefs. As Brad Hooker

1

There certainly are alternative ways to understand justification, and one might object to Sinnott-Armstrong’s
argument form cognitive biases by disagreeing with him at this early stage. I think, however, that SinnottArmstrong’s argument fails on a more fundamental level, in that it requires a false hidden premise, and thus I will
largely follow Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of the relevant concepts.
2
It is important to note that, according to Sinnott-Armstrong, to be justified in believing B inferentially, S does not
actually need to make the inference of B from some other belief; S needs only to be able to draw this inference. The
idea is that “the requisite information [must] be encoded somehow” in S’s brain at the right time (Sinnott-Armstrong
2006a; Hooker 2002).
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puts it, “a moral belief can be justified by some feature other than its inferential relations with
other beliefs” (2002, 163). 3 Intuitionists differ in their theories of what that “other”, justifying
feature of moral intuitions is (reliabilism, Shafer-Landau 2003; moral experientialism, Tolhurst
1990; reflectionism, Audi 2004). But all intuitionists share the thesis that certain moral beliefs
can be justified (in some way) non-inferentially. This general thesis will be the topic of the
present discussion. Such intuitionism is a version of foundationalism in moral epistemology; the
moral beliefs that are justified non-inferentially provide a foundation for the inferential
justification of other moral beliefs. In this way, epistemological moral intuitionism provides a
stopping point for the skeptical regress—it ends at the non-inferentially justified moral beliefs.
The belief B might be justified by being inferred from the justified belief B`, but if B` is justified
non-inferentially, then the regress has lost its viciousness.
As Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a) notes, intuitionists also disagree about the content of the
beliefs that can be justified non-inferentially: are they about what is good (Moore 1903), or what
is right (Ross 1930)? And they disagree about the generality of the beliefs: are they beliefs about
abstract principles (Sidgwick 1907), generalizations (Ross 1930), or particular actions (Prichard
1968)? Still, they agree that the non-inferentially justified beliefs are, unsurprisingly, moral
intuitions. To be precise, I will follow Sinnott-Armstrong in defining a moral intuition as “a
strong, immediate moral belief” (2008a). By ‘strong’, Sinnott-Armstrong means that one would
not easily give up the belief; by ‘immediate’, he means that the belief is formed noninferentially. That is, “a belief’s status as an intuition consists in its being arrived at not by

3

I may sometimes refer to a belief being justified, but this is only shorthand for saying that the believer is justified in
holding the belief (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006a).
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inference from other moral beliefs” (Hooker 2002, 162). 4 The idea is that a moral belief is an
intuition when it is not formed based on any actually performed inference, regardless of whether
the believer is able to infer the moral belief from other (moral or non-moral) beliefs. So a given
intuition may be “accessible via inference”—that is, one might, in fact, be able to infer it from
other beliefs—but moral intuitions in general need not bear inferential relations to other beliefs
(Hooker 2002, 162). They are intuitions just in virtue of their not being formed inferentially.
A point worth noting that seems to have been largely ignored in the contemporary
discussion of epistemological moral intuitionism is that this definition of ‘moral intuition’ is
quite different from the one offered by some classic intuitionists, like G.E. Moore. 5 So we are
right to ask how these notions of intuitions differ, and how they might be related. Moore thought
of a moral intuition more generally as a non-inferentially justified (not formed) moral belief (I
will call such moral intuitions “Moorean moral intuitions”; 1903). In Principia Ethica, he is quite
explicit in this, saying “when I call such propositions ‘Intuitions,’ I mean merely to assert that
they are incapable of proof; I imply nothing whatever as to the manner or origin of our cognition
of them” (1903). As you can see, in contrast to the definition of intuition above, Moore clearly
meant to imply nothing about the way the beliefs or propositions are formed in calling them
intuitions. A Moorean moral intuition could be formed via inference, or not—but it certainly was
not provable or justifiable via inference. But Moore then needs to say just which (if any) moral
beliefs can be non-inferentially justified: Which moral beliefs are or can be Moorean moral
intuitions? The contemporary definition of moral intuition differs from Moore’s in that it builds
an answer to this question into the definition. The moral beliefs that can be Moorean moral

4

It is not particularly relevant to our discussion, but Hooker suggests this immediacy (being formed or “arrived at”
non-inferentially) is all there is to being an intuition. Since we will be discussing Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument on
his own terms, we will follow him in adding that the belief must be ‘strong’.
5
Andrew Altman pointed out this oversight to me.
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intuitions are the ones that are formed non-inferentially, and those are what are currently being
called moral intuitions (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008a; Hooker 2002). Moore certainly objected to
this answer to the question of which moral beliefs can be Moorean moral intuitions. He thought
it was not just any moral belief that is formed non-inferentially that could count as a Moorean
moral intuition (i.e. a moral intuition that can be justified non-inferentially), but rather only those
moral beliefs that are formed after due reflection and with sufficient expertise. Specifically,
Moore wanted to talk about the moral beliefs or propositions offered by the “ethical
philosopher”—that is, the ‘moral expert’ (1903; see specifically the Preface).
But for epistemological moral intuitionism, there is a serious flaw in this attempt to
identify which moral beliefs can be Moorean moral intuitions, or can be justified noninferentially. The problem is that expert moral beliefs, such as the belief that M (some expert
moral belief), can be justified inferentially based on the fact that they are expert. That is, the
expert belief that M can be justified by inferring it from some reason that expert beliefs are
epistemically superior (like the fact that they are more reliable than other beliefs), and that an
expert believes that M. And thus, expert beliefs as a class of moral beliefs defined by their being
‘expert’ cannot form the class of Moorean moral intuitions. The expert class of moral beliefs is
distinguished by its being superior epistemically, and this fact makes the beliefs it contains
inferentially justifiable (from the fact that they are part of an epistemically superior class).
One will always need to offer some reason that justifies distinguishing expert beliefs
from other beliefs as the beliefs that can be Moorean moral intuitions (i.e. the beliefs that can be
justified non-inferentially), like the fact that they are reflected upon more closely, that they are
more reliable, or that they are more rational. But whatever the reason, it will make one able to
inferentially justify the expert beliefs. Indeed, the reason needs to make one able to inferentially
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justify the expert beliefs, or else it would not be a good reason to distinguish those beliefs as
potential Moorean moral intuitions. Imagine if the above reason that expert beliefs are superior
was not that they are more reliable, but that they sound cooler; this would not be a good reason to
think that expert beliefs are Moorean intuitions, and it also would not provide inferential
justification of the expert beliefs. One could not inferentially justify an expert’s belief that M by
reasoning from the fact that it sounds cooler. But if sounding cool was a good reason to think
expert beliefs are Moorean intuitions, then, indeed, sounding cool could provide inferential
justification of expert beliefs by plugging the reason (sounding cool) into the inferential equation
above; the expert belief that M can be justified by inferring it from the fact that expert beliefs are
epistemically superior because they sound cooler, and that an expert believes that M. The point is
that any good epistemic reason to distinguish a subset of moral beliefs as candidates for Moorean
moral intuitions also provides inferential justification of that subset of beliefs, and thus precludes
the subset from being the class of Moorean moral intuitions. A given expert moral belief may be
a Moorean moral intuition—but no subset of moral beliefs can be justifiably identified on
epistemic grounds, such as their being expert, as being the class of Moorean moral intuitions. To
put it another way, some expert beliefs may be Moorean moral intuitions, but this cannot be in
virtue of their being “expert,” as such an epistemic virtue makes them inferentially justifiable
(and thus not Moorean intuitions).
It seems to me that it is for this reason that contemporary intuitionists in moral
epistemology define moral intuitions as moral beliefs that are formed non-inferentially—and
hold that these are the candidates for Moorean moral intuitions. By defining moral intuitions in
this way, they can avoid the folly of offering an epistemic reason for identifying a certain class of
moral beliefs as Moorean moral intuitions.
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2 The argument from cognitive biases
In a recent paper, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong offers what I have called “the argument from
cognitive biases” against intuitionism, which I will suggest is merely a renewed version of the
argument from disagreement (2008a). Sinnott-Armstrong wields evidence from empirical
psychology suggesting that moral intuitions are subject to cognitive biases to argue that moral
intuitions are unreliable, must be confirmed to be justified, and can only be inferentially
justified—and thus that intuitionism is false (2008a). I will discuss the parallel with the argument
from disagreement in more detail later, but for now, notice that whereas the argument from
disagreement argues that moral intuitions are unreliable on the basis of between-subject
differences in moral intuitions (i.e. moral disagreements between different people or groups), the
argument from cognitive biases argues that moral intuitions are unreliable on the basis of withinsubject differences in moral intuitions. That is, it argues on the basis of cognitive biases which
make it likely that a single person will have inconsistent intuitions about different, but
objectively equivalent or relevantly similar moral situations. (I will refer to between-subject
disagreement simply as moral disagreement, and within-subject disagreement as cognitive
biases.)
To be precise, I define a cognitive bias as a tendency for a cognitive process, like the
formation of moral intuitions, to be affected by purportedly irrelevant properties of a stimuli; and
this susceptibility to modification by irrelevant factors reveals the cognitive process to be
unreliable. For example, a cognitive bias might make it likely that a person will have different
moral intuitions about effectively equivalent moral scenarios or dilemmas presented using
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different words. 6 Take Sinnott-Armstrong’s example of Joseph, who would believe that Marion
is fast when told that she runs one hundred meters in ten seconds, but would believe that she is
not fast (and is slow) when told that she runs one hundred meters in ten thousand milliseconds
(2008a). Since Joseph would form such drastically different beliefs about running speed in
objectively equivalent situations, his beliefs about (Marion’s) running speed, in general, are not
reliable. Perhaps his beliefs about ‘running speed in seconds’ are reliable, and only those about
‘running speed in milliseconds’ are unreliable (maybe because he thinks that one millisecond is
one thousand seconds, rather than one thousandth of a second). Nonetheless, his beliefs about
running speed, in general, are unreliable (since beliefs about ‘running speed in milliseconds’ are
inaccurate and are part of the class of his beliefs about running speed). To show the unreliability
of moral intuitions, Sinnott-Armstrong cites a variety of framing effects, cognitive biases like the
one just described in which a subject’s moral intuitions are affected by the wording used to
describe a moral dilemma or by the order in which dilemmas are presented (2008a). Extending
Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument, Thomas Naddelhoffer and Adam Feltz argue that moral
intuitions are unreliable not only because they are subject to framing effects, but also because
they are subject to another well-known cognitive bias, the self-other asymmetry, whereby
people’s intuitions about a scenario are affected by whether the scenario is presented in the first
or third person context (in prep.; Malle 2006).
When these sorts of cognitive biases of moral intuitions occur, there is essentially a
within-subject disagreement in moral intuitions. The same subject has inconsistent intuitions

6

It is important to note that biases make it likely that a given person’s intuitions will be affected by irrelevant
factors. This means that any given person’s intuitions might be completely unaffected by irrelevant factors; the bias
merely makes it likely that her intuitions will be so affected.
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about different presentations of objectively equivalent scenarios. Assuming non-relativism, 7 at
least one of the inconsistent intuitions must be wrong, and thus at least some moral intuitions are
fallible. If such cognitive biases, or within-subject moral disagreements, are sufficiently
prevalent, then the reliability of moral intuitions as a class of beliefs would be called into
question, since that class would include all of the inconsistent pairs of beliefs (half of which are
mistaken); one could not rely on her moral intuitions (i.e. could not say that her moral intuitions
reliably track the moral truth), since so many of them would be mistaken.
Sinnott-Armstrong argues that if moral intuitions are unreliable due to cognitive biases in
this way, then moral intuitions would require confirmation to be justified—since without
confirmation there would be no way to know if a given intuition is one of the accurate or
inaccurate ones in the class of moral intuitions (2006a; 2008a; 2008b). The problem is that
confirmation of a moral intuition can justify that intuition only on inferential grounds. This is
because the confirmation justifies the intuition by making the person able to infer her intuition
from the confirming evidence (recall the Ford example discussed in the Introduction; see Section
2.1). Thus, if cognitive biases of moral intuitions (i.e. within-subject moral disagreement) are
sufficiently prevalent to bring the reliability of moral intuitions into question, moral intuitionism
is false; moral intuitions would require confirmation to be justified, and thus cannot be justified
non-inferentially. To put it explicitly, the argument from cognitive biases looks like this: 8
C1) If moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive biases
to show that moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable, then
moral intuitions must be confirmed in order to be justified
7

I will be objecting to Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument from cognitive biases while granting his non-relativist moral
realism, which holds that there are objective (non-relativist) moral facts. He says, “I believe that many acts are
morally wrong. I think that my positive moral beliefs are true and correspond to moral facts” (2006a, 58). I am
aware the one could object to his arguments by rejecting these assumptions; but I believe his argument can be
objected to even granting his assumptions.
8
This is my formulation of the argument, reconstructed from Sinnott-Armstrong 2008a; 2008b; 2006a. I believe it
accurately represents Sinnott-Armstrong’s main argument provided in 2008a in light of the expanded version of the
argument presented in 2008b and his views on confirmation made explicit in 2006a (see especially Chapter 9).
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(because without confirmation, a believer is not justified in
believing her intuitions were formed reliably rather than
unreliably, and thus she is not justified in believing those
intuitions)
C2) If moral intuitions require confirmation in order to be justified,
then they can only be justified inferentially.
C3) If moral intuitions can only be justified inferentially, then
moral intuitionism is false.
C4) Moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive biases to
show that moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable. 9
C5) Moral intuitionism is false.
Most of the action occurs in premises C1, C2, and C4. Premise C3 is straightforward,
since intuitionism just claims that some moral intuitions can be justified non-inferentially. In
Section 2.1 I will discuss why, as premise C2 suggests, confirmation of moral intuitions provides
only inferential justification of those intuitions. In section 2.2 I will look at premises C1 and C4
in more detail. In Section 2.3 I will examine exactly why Sinnott-Armstrong thinks that premise
C4 is true, reviewing the evidence of cognitive biases of moral intuitions, and I will assess the
status of C4 in Section 2.3.5. In 2.4 I discuss a potential initial objection which rejects the
argument’s internalist bias. In Section 3, I will discuss the intuitionist’s objection to the argument
from disagreement—that most moral disagreement is grounded in non-moral disagreement—
which I adapt as a response to the argument from cognitive biases in Section 4.

2.1 Confirmation of moral intuitions justifies inferentially
Premise C2 above says that if moral intuitions must be confirmed in order to be justified,
then they can only be justified inferentially. This is because, on Sinnott-Armstrong’s
understanding, confirmation of a belief provides only inferential justification of that belief
(2006a). Confirmation makes a person justified in holding a belief because she can infer her
belief from the evidence that confirmed it. For example, say that Mary believes that Andy
9

The intuitions are not just unreliable, but we ought to know that they are unreliable. This just means that we ought
to be aware of the truth of C4—i.e. of the prevalence of cognitive biases.
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Pettitte, who plays baseball for the New York Yankees, took steroids (call this belief S), and she
believes S because a rival Red Sox fan told her so. Her belief came from a biased, unreliable
source and she knows it, so she is not justified in believing S without confirmation of S. When
Mary sees Pettitte on ESPN later that evening confirming his steroid use, she is now justified in
believing S, that Pettitte took steroids. And the key is that this confirmation justifies Mary’s
belief that S inferentially; she is justified because after receiving confirmation of S, she now has
the ability to infer S from that confirmation. That is, Mary can infer S, that Pettitte took steroids,
from the fact that he admitted taking steroids. In this way, confirmation of a belief provides
justification of that belief just because a believer can infer the belief from the confirming
evidence.

2.2 Cognitive biases create the need for confirmation
If moral intuitions require confirmation to be justified, then since confirmation provides
only inferential justification, moral intuitions could be justified only inferentially. Premise C1
states that sufficient cognitive biases of moral intuitions would create a need for such
confirmation of moral intuitions. Sinnott-Armstrong notes that “confirmation is needed for a
believer to be justified in holding a belief that other people deny or doubt, when the believer has
no reason to prefer one believer to the other” (2006a, p. 193). His point here about betweensubject disagreement creating the need for confirmation applies analogously to within-subject
disagreement (like cognitive biases) creating the need for confirmation. A believer cannot be
justified in believing one intuition over an incompatible one without some reason or
confirmation that supports one or the other intuition, because there would be no way to know
which intuition ought to be relied on (Smythe and Evans 2007). And this is the case whether the
incompatible intuitions are from two different people, or the same person under different
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conditions as in the case of cognitive biases. For example, imagine a between-subject
disagreement between Mary and Patty. While Mary believes S (that Andy Pettitte took steroids)
Patty believes ~S (that Andy Pettitte did not take steroids). Both women are equally informed,
having the same evidence, but they have based their differing beliefs on different character
assessments of Brian McNamee (the trainer who accused Pettitte of taking steroids). Mary thinks
McNamee is trustworthy, while Patty thinks he is a liar. Without any confirmation of one of their
beliefs to suggest one belief over the other, neither can be justified. They would need to know
who is a more reliable judge of character, or have some other confirmation of one of their
beliefs, in order for that belief to be justified. In this way, inconsistency in beliefs creates a need
for confirmation of those beliefs. 10
In premise C4, however, inconsistency in moral beliefs due to cognitive biases creates the
need for the whole class of moral intuitions to be confirmed, not just some particular moral
intuitions. For biases to create the need to confirm a whole class of beliefs, the biases must be
sufficiently prevalent to bring the reliability of that class of beliefs into question. To illustrate the
point, consider Sinnott-Armstrong’s thermometer analogy (2002). Imagine you have a hundred
very old thermometers, and you know that some of them are inaccurate. If a sufficient amount of
them are inaccurate, then you are not justified in trusting the temperature readings of any one
thermometer until you confirm whether it is accurate or inaccurate—this group of thermometers
would be unreliable. The same goes for classes of beliefs; if a sufficient amount of a certain class
of beliefs is mistaken or unreliable, then nobody is justified in holding a belief from that class
10

It should be clear that not every disagreement is one that creates a need for new or further confirmation. A
disagreement that persists between a well-informed believer and an ill-informed believer has a need for confirmation
or a reason to prefer one believer or the other (since there is a disagreement), but that need has been met by the fact
that one believer is better informed than the other. The disagreement still creates the need for confirmation, but that
need has been readily met. A reason to prefer one belief over another can be thought of as a type of confirmation of
the belief. So confirmation is not necessary when one has a reason to prefer one belief over another because
confirmation has already been provided by the reason.
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without confirming that the belief is one of the accurate ones in the class—the class is unreliable.
The amount that must be mistaken in order to demonstrate unreliability will vary depending on
what is being shown to be unreliable, and what the risks are of being mistaken. For the
thermometers in this case, there does not seem to be any great risk if we are mistaken about the
temperature, so the amount of thermometers that must be inaccurate to show that the
thermometers, as a group, are unreliable and require confirmation is probably pretty high—say
around 15 percent of the thermometers. In the case of moral beliefs, the stakes are higher, so the
percent of moral intuitions that must be mistaken to show that moral intuitions, as a class of
beliefs, are unreliable and require confirmation is probably rather low—Sinnott-Armstrong
suggests around only 5 percent (2008b). If 5 percent are inaccurate, then we need to confirm a
given intuition for it to be justified.
Consider a world in which half of the population believes that using water boarding to
torture terrorism suspects is generally morally acceptable, while the other half believes that it is
not. Half of this world is right, and half wrong about the moral status of water boarding. 11
Considering the whole class of moral beliefs about water boarding in the population, half of the
beliefs in that class are accurate while the other half is not. If a class of beliefs only tracks the
truth 50% of the time, it seems clear that one should not rely on such beliefs. In order to be
justified in relying on a moral belief about water boarding in this world, one would need to
confirm that her belief is in the 50% of beliefs about water boarding that are accurate, rather than
the other half. Since it is difficult to imagine what sort of confirming evidence one could find
about her moral beliefs on water boarding, you can see why Mackie favored the skeptical
conclusion; confirmation of one’s moral beliefs is needed, which means they cannot be justified
non-inferentially, but no confirmation seems imminent, which suggests that they cannot be
11

Again, this is on the assumption of non-relativistic moral realism.
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justified inferentially either (1977). The point against intuitionism, though, is just that some
confirmation of one’s moral intuitions about water boarding in the imagined world is needed,
whether it is imminent or not, in order for a believer to be justified in her belief about water
boarding. This is because without confirmation there is a 50/50 chance that her belief is
inaccurate versus accurate. Thus her moral belief can only be justified with confirmation, and
can accordingly only be justified inferentially (since confirmation justifies inferentially, as
discussed in Section 2.1).
Thus, for cognitive biases (or moral disagreement) to create the need to confirm moral
intuitions in order for them to be justified, the biases (or disagreements) would have to be
sufficiently prevalent such that the reliability of moral intuitions, as a class of intuitions, was
called into question. And, according to the argument from cognitive biases (and from
disagreement), if the biases (or disagreements) are sufficiently prevalent to show that moral
intuitions are unreliable, then moral intuitions would require confirmation to be justified and
could only be justified inferentially; that is, moral intuitionism would be false, moral intuitions
cannot be justified non-inferentially. For Mackie (1977), Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a; 2008a;
2008b), Stich, and many others, this is exactly what they see in the case of moral disagreement;
disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions are unreliable, and thus
require confirmation to be justified and cannot be non-inferentially justified. Machery, Kelley
and Stich note that “for almost any moral issue, it is possible to find people who hold opposing
moral views” (2005). Sinnott-Armstrong says simply that “the range of disagreements among
strongly-held non-inferable moral beliefs…shows that many moral believers are unreliable”
(2002). But what about cognitive biases of moral intuitions? Sinnott-Armstrong argues that,
indeed, they are sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions are unreliable.
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2.3 The empirical picture so far
So for Sinnott-Armstrong, if moral intuitions are unreliable due to cognitive biases, then
they must be confirmed in order to be justified, they are justified only inferentially, and
intuitionism is false. All that appears left for this argument to go through is the truth of premise
C4. That is, what remains to be shown is that cognitive biases of moral intuitions are prevalent
enough to show that a sufficient amount of moral intuitions are inaccurate, and accordingly that
moral intuitions are unreliable; cognitive biases will have to be shown to affect a variety of moral
intuitions in a variety of circumstances. To this end, Sinnott-Armstrong cites several studies of
framing effects, which I review below in Sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.3 (2008a). Then in Section
2.3.4, I will review evidence of another kind of cognitive bias, the self-other asymmetry,
affecting moral intuitions (Nadelhoffer and Feltz in prep.). In 2.3.5, I sum up the status of C4,
which looks to be on solid ground. Then I review a potential objection to the argument in Section
2.4. In Section 4 I will offer a different objection to the argument from cognitive biases
analogous to the classic objection to the argument from disagreement from the non-moral basis
of moral disagreement (which is reviewed in Section 3); just as the argument from disagreement
requires that the moral disagreements are not grounded in non-moral disagreements, I will
suggest that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument requires that the cognitive biases of moral intuitions
must not be grounded in biases of non-moral judgments—and that it appears the biases are so
grounded in biases of non-moral judgments. But first, I will discuss the evidence of cognitive
biases of moral intuitions.
2.3.1 Tversky and Kahneman
In a seminal paper, Tversky and Kahneman were the first to investigate framing effects.
They presented subjects in group 1 (N=152) with the following scenario:
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Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.
Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of
the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people
will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981)
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Subjects in group 2 (N=155) read the same “cover story”, but the programs had different
consequences:
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will
die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Subjects then had to choose a Program between A and B (for subjects in group 1) or between C
and D (for subjects in group 2). What is important to note is that Programs A and C are
objectively identical, resulting in the exact same numbers of lives saved (200) and lives lost
(400). The same goes for Programs B and D; both have a 1/3 probability that 600 lives will be
saved, and a 2/3 probability that 600 lives will be lost. Thus, subjects in groups 1 and 2 were
choosing between the exact same programs, just framed in different ways: the first group’s
programs are framed in terms of the lives that will be saved, whereas the second group’s
programs are framed in terms of the lives that will be lost.
Nonetheless, 72% of subjects in group 1 chose A (and 28% chose B) while only 22% of
subjects in group 2 chose C (and 78% chose D). Thus, the wording of the scenarios has a huge
influence on people’s moral judgments. When the options are framed in terms of the lives saved
people are much more likely to be risk averse; most people (72%) chose to save 200 lives and
lose 400 lives, rather than choosing to take a chance at saving all 600 lives at the risk of all 600
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lives being lost. In contrast, when the options are framed in terms of the lives lost people are
much more likely to be risk taking; most people (78%) chose to take a chance at saving all 600
lives at the risk of all 600 lives being lost, rather than choosing to save 200 lives and lose 400
lives. While subjects’ judgments were about choosing which program should be favored, it
seems reasonable to follow Sinnott-Armstrong in interpreting their judgments as reflecting their
moral intuitions about the scenarios (2008a).
But as Sinnott-Armstrong notes, there should be little doubt that “descriptions cannot
affect what is really morally right or wrong in this situation” (2008a); that is, wording (in terms
of lives saved versus lives lost) is a morally irrelevant property of the stimuli. People’s moral
beliefs should not depend on such factors. 12 Accordingly, the Tversky and Kahneman study
shows a clear example of a cognitive bias, specifically a framing effect, on moral beliefs. It’s
clear, Sinnott-Armstrong says, that “such moral beliefs are unreliable” (2008a). But this is only
one cognitive bias affecting moral intuitions in one set of circumstances; is there more evidence
of cognitive biases of moral intuitions?
2.3.2 Petrinovich and O’Neill
In a study by Petrinovich and O’Neill, the authors again found that “there were framing
effects [on people’s moral intuitions] produced by differences in wording” (1996). They
presented subjects with the standard trolley dilemma:
A trolley is hurtling down the tracks. There are five
innocent people on the track ahead of the trolley, and they will be
killed if the trolley continues going straight ahead. There is a spur
of track leading off to the side. There is one innocent person on
that spur of track. The brakes of the trolley have failed and there is

12

I, along with Sinnott-Armstrong, Tversky and Kahneman, and many others, take it that this is an apparently
irrelevant property of the situation; the burden would be on someone who disagrees to show why it is in fact
relevant.
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a switch that can be activated to cause the trolley to go to the side
track.
You are an innocent bystander (that is, not an employee of
the railroad, etc.). You can throw the switch, saving the five
innocent people, which will result in the death of the one innocent
person on the side track. What do you do? (Petrinovich and
O’Neill 1996)
Subjects were then asked to rate on an odd number scale (no zero) from -5 (strongly
disagree) to +5 (strongly agree) how much they disagreed or agreed with each of the two horns
of the dilemma—throwing the switch and not throwing the switch. For half of the subjects, the
dilemma was presented in a Kill wording: “throw the switch which will result in the death of the
one innocent person on the side track” or “do nothing, which will result in the death of the five
innocent people.” For the other half of the subjects, the dilemma was presented in a Save
wording: “throw the switch, which will result in the five innocent people on the main track being
saved” or “do nothing, which will result in the one innocent person being saved” (Petrinovich
and O’Neill 1996). Notice that the Kill and Save wording are objectively identical, and differ
only in terms of the way the outcomes are framed.
As you’ve probably guessed, subjects who saw the Save wording were likely to agree
more strongly with throwing the switch (mean agreement of +0.65 on the -5 to +5 scale) than
subjects who saw the Kill wording (mean agreement of -0.78). People had different moral
intuitions, depending on how the dilemma was framed—using Kill wording or Save wording.
Since, as before, wording is a rather obvious example of a morally irrelevant property of a
stimuli (a property that should not affect one’s moral beliefs about the stimuli), SinnottArmstrong concludes that the Petrinovich and O’Neill study presents another circumstance in
which moral intuitions are unreliable due to the effects of a cognitive bias.
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2.3.3 Haidt and Baron
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 highlighted examples of word framing effects on moral
intuitions. Haidt and Baron (to their surprise) found that moral intuitions can also be affected by
order framing effects (1996). In one experiment, they presented all subjects with two versions of
a scenario in which Nick is trying to sell his car, 1984 Mazda MPG, to Kathy, and subjects were
asked to rate Nick’s “goodness” in each version (from extremely bad/reprehensible to extremely
good). In the Act version, Nick actively lies to Kathy about the year that many Mazda MPGs had
a manufacturer’s defect so that she does not know that it happened in 1984, the year Nick’s car
was made. In the Omission version, Kathy mentions to Nick that she thinks she heard
somewhere that Mazda MPGs had a defect in 1983, and Nick fails to correct her (he withholds,
or omits, the information about the correct year of the defect). Half of the subjects read and
responded to the Omission version first and the Act version second, and the other half read and
responded in the opposite order—Act first and Omission second.
Haidt and Baron found a large order effect, as “eighty percent of subjects in the omissionfirst condition rated the act worse than the omission, while only 50 percent of subjects in the actfirst condition made such a distinction” (1996). So, when subjects read Omission before Act,
they are very likely to say that Nick is worse in Act (when he actively lies) than Omission (when
he merely withholds information). In contrast, when subjects read Act before Omission, they are
much less likely to say that Nick is worse in Act than Omission. Haidt and Baron suggest that
much of this effect is due to subjects who read Act first being unwilling to “‘pull back’ and
partially excuse the omission” after rating Nick on the ‘extremely bad’ end of the scale in Act
(1996). Thus, subjects who read Act first rate Nick in Act and Omission as quite a bad person.
But subjects who read Omission first have no trouble excusing Nick’s omission, rating him as
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not so bad, since they haven’t antecedently judged him to be bad in Act—and then when they
read Act, they rate Nick as bad because it is much easier to ‘add-on’ blame than it is to ‘pull it
back’.
There is probably an evolutionary story that could be told to explain why adding-on
blame is easier than pulling it back; perhaps about how risking over-blaming others (by easily
adding blame, and not easily taking it back) is a safe, advantageous practice. But whatever the
best explanation of the data turns out to be, the fact is that moral intuitions about the moral status
of Nick’s character in Act and Omission are affected by the order in which people read the two
versions. Thus, on the assumption that the order in which moral intuitions are formed is morally
irrelevant—i.e. should not affect the intuitions—it seems that this is another circumstance in
which moral intuitions are unreliable due to the effects of a cognitive bias.
2.3.4 Nadelhoffer and Feltz
So far we have looked at framing effects on moral intuitions, which are a specific type of
cognitive bias whereby a cognitive process is biased by the presentation of the dilemma (e.g.
wording or order effects). Nadelhoffer and Feltz have recently found that moral intuitions can
also be affected by another well-known cognitive bias, the self-other asymmetry (in prep.; Malle
2006). This is a bias which causes people to make different judgments about, or perceive
differently, stimuli presented in the first versus third-person point of view. An example is the
famous attribution bias in social psychology: people are likely to attribute other people’s
behavior as deriving from their character, but likely to attribute the exact same behavior as
deriving from external circumstances when it is their own behavior (Malle 2006). The authors in
the present study presented subjects with the traditional trolley dilemma, almost identical to the
one used by Petrinovich and O’Neill (1996). Half of the subjects were placed in the Self
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condition, and saw the original dilemma, where the subject herself is depicted as performing the
action in the dilemma (of throwing or not throwing the switch). The dilemmatic question then
asks if it is morally permissible for “you” (the subject) to throw the switch. The other half of the
subjects were placed in the Other condition and saw a modified version of the trolley dilemma in
which it is another person (John) who is depicted as performing the action in the dilemma. The
dilemmatic question then asks if it is morally permissible for “John” to throw the switch.
Rather unexpectedly, 65% of subjects in the Self condition judged throwing the switch
permissible, whereas 90% of subjects in the Other condition judged throwing the switch
permissible (Nadelhoffer and Feltz in prep.). That is, subjects are significantly more likely to
judge throwing the switch to be morally permissible when it is another person who throws the
switch than when it is the subjects themselves throwing the switch. According to Nadelhoffer
and Feltz, “it is clear that it can’t be less morally permissible for me to hit the switch than it is for
someone else to hit the switch—all things being equal” (in prep.). Presumably Sinnott-Armstrong
would agree; all else being equal, the specific person who performs an action is a morally
irrelevant property of the scenario. Thus, we have found another instance of moral intuitions
being affected by a cognitive bias. 13
2.3.5 The status of premise C4
Now that we have reviewed all of the evidence offered by Sinnott-Armstrong, and some
additional support from Nadelhoffer and Feltz, we are prepared to evaluate the status of premise
C4, which states that moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive biases to show that
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable. On Sinnott-Armstrong’s account, “together these
13

It may be worth noting that Nadelhoffer and Feltz explain this bias by arguing that the Self condition is more
emotionally salient than the Other condition because the subject is actually described as being present and as
performing the action (in prep.). They argue that this higher salience leads subjects to be more likely to reject the
flipping the switch in Self than they are in Other.
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studies show that moral intuitions are subject to framing effects in many circumstances” (2008a).
And we could add that it seems that moral intuitions are subject not just to framing effects, but at
least one other cognitive bias as well (the self-other asymmetry). Thus, Sinnott-Armstrong
concludes that premise C4 is on solid ground.
There are a variety of responses that intuitionists can offer against premise C4. First of
all, it seems clear that we have not seen evidence of anything close to “many circumstances” in
which moral intuitions are subject to cognitive biases. A handful of studies about hypothetical
and often unrealistic dilemmas (e.g. trolley dilemmas) shows very little about whether our real
world moral intuitions are affected by cognitive biases at all, let alone whether they are affected
by biases in many circumstances. In a brief response to Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument from
cognitive biases, William Tolhurst noted that “the studies [cited by Sinnott-Armstrong] were
designed to elicit framing effects in the subjects”; whereas “the situations in which we generally
form our spontaneous moral beliefs are not” (2008). Moreover, our ordinary intuitions are not
formed in response to verbally formulated moral questions—they are in response to perceptually
presented stimuli (like seeing a person steal a candy bar or tell a lie) (Tolhurst 2008). The point
is that the evidence reviewed above shows very little about our ordinary moral intuitions,
whether or not they are affected by cognitive biases, and if they are so affected, to what extent
they are affected. As Shafer-Landau suggests, it is fair to say “that, as yet, we simply do not have
a sufficient number of relevant experiments to give us much indication of how many of our
moral beliefs are subject to framing effects” (2008). Furthermore, consider the fact that while
Petrinovich and O’Neill did report framing effects on people’s moral intuitions, the authors also
reported that “the effects were not always large nor did they always appear” (1996). They also
note that “the research evidence for reflection and framing effects is mixed rather than uniformly
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positive, being dependent on differences in problem characteristics that are only partly
understood” (1996). Considering the countless moral intuitions we form in our ordinary, day-today lives—like when we read the newspaper, watch television, or gossip with friends—“mixed”
evidence for framing effects in some laboratory experiments does not seem like evidence of our
intuitions being biased in “many circumstances”.
Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to rebut this objection about insufficient evidence. He
suggests that for moral intuitions to be justified they must have a very high degree of reliability,
probably close to what scientists require for the justification of scientific beliefs: “if moral beliefs
are to be justified in anything like the way scientific beliefs are justified, then it has to be
reasonable to assign them a probability [of truth] of at least .95” (2008b). While he offers this
general degree of reliability, he tries to avoid committing to a specific degree, or to a specific
prevalence of cognitive biases of moral intuitions that would be required to show unreliability of
the whole class of moral intuitions. He says simply that “if someone denies that [the empirical
results discussed above] are large enough, then my only recourse is to recite the details of the
studies, to invoke the high costs of mistaken moral intuitions, and to remind critics that only a
minimal kind of [moral] confirmation is needed” (2008b, 101). 14 His point is that a very high
percentage of moral intuitions in the class of moral intuitions must be true in order for the class
to be reliable, because our moral intuitions are too important to risk them being inaccurate. Thus,
he suggests, the results above demonstrate that cognitive biases of moral intuitions are
sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions are unreliable.

14

By minimal confirmation, Sinnott-Armstrong simply means that the confirmation needed to justify the moral
intuition does not actually need to be used to infer the intuition; for Sinnott-Armstrong, a believer’s confirmed moral
intuition is justified so long as the believer is able to infer the intuition, even if she never actually performs the
inference—that is, so long as she can offer the confirmation if asked, and demonstrate an understanding of the
inferential link between the confirmation and the intuition.
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But Sinnott-Armstrong’s response here assumes that the moral intuitions probed in the
studies of cognitive biases are ordinary moral intuitions. It is our ordinary moral intuitions that
are at issue in the argument from cognitive biases, and it is not clear that the empirical studies
cited above show any evidence that our ordinary moral intuitions are subject to cognitive biases
at all, let alone to a sufficient degree to raise questions about their reliability. Clearly moral
intuitions can be biased, but professional scientist’s scientific intuitions could probably be biased
as well if they are presented with appropriate stimuli. I presume that this would not lead us to
judge their ordinary scientific intuitions (i.e. the intuitions that they have in the lab every day) to
be unreliable, since the stimuli used to generate the bias are likely to be far from the ordinary
one’s that the scientists would encounter in their lab. If ordinary stimuli do generate significant
biases of people’s intuitions, then we can draw the conclusion that ordinary intuitions are subject
to cognitive biases, and thus, depending on the prevalence of the biases, we can assess the
reliability of those ordinary intuitions. The evidence offered by Sinnott-Armstrong does not use
ordinary stimuli to generate biases. And therefore, the conclusions we can draw about ordinary
moral intuitions are limited, at best.
Moreover, the experiments cited have subjects making a variety of judgments, like
choosing which program to implement or agreeing with a course of action. It takes some work to
show that these judgments are reflective of people’s moral intuitions. Subjects’ responses likely
reflect a variety of considerations, not just moral ones. But even if we grant the subjects’
responses are reflective of a moral judgment, as I mentioned briefly in Section 2.3.1, it is not
clear that these judgments reflect moral intuitions (as we’ve defined them here) or moral beliefs.
In order to show that the effects probed in the cited studies are biases of moral intuitions, there
should also be evidence that the moral beliefs subjects form are moral beliefs that have not been
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formed inferentially and that subjects are unwilling to give them up easily. Again, the empirical
picture simply isn’t complete enough to make a determination on this issue. Despite these
concerns, I am inclined to grant Sinnott-Armstrong the benefit of the doubt that sufficient
evidence of cognitive biases of ordinary moral intuitions will emerge. Thinking about my own
everyday moral reasoning, it seems certain that my moral intuitions are affected by morally
irrelevant factors from my own mood to perceptual properties of the stimuli.
There are a variety of examples from the empirical literature other than the ones cited by
Sinnott-Armstrong that could be interpreted as relevant here. For example, consider the startling
evidence of implicit prejudice or implicit gender biases (see Brauer, Wasel & Niedenthal 2000
for a review of implicit prejudice; see Banjai and Greenwald 1995 for implicit gender bias).
People who explicitly reject prejudice are likely to show evidence of implicit racial biases. For
example, people who explicitly reject prejudice are likely to have different psychophysiological
responses (e.g. heart rate and skin conductance) to stimuli depicting black people versus those
depicting white people. While this evidence of implicit prejudice does not show a cognitive bias
of moral intuitions, it seems reasonable to infer that implicit prejudice does bias moral intuitions;
that is, it seems reasonable to think that implicit prejudice leads the same person to form
inconsistent moral intuitions about people from different races performing objectively identical
actions. The race of the person performing an action is quite clearly a morally irrelevant aspect
of the situation being judged, but given the evidence of implicit prejudice, this is exactly what we
should expect. Imagine Jane, who is walking down a city street late at night and notices a man
approaching her from behind. Upon looking back, it seems that implicit prejudice could result
Jane being likely to form different moral intuitions about the man depending on his race. We like
to think that we are unaffected by such implicit biases, but the evidence of implicit prejudice is
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extensive, and such evidence leads me to accept the fact that our moral intuitions are likely
affected by many cognitive biases in many circumstances. Thus, I think it is fair to assess the
argument from cognitive biases on the assumption that premise C4 will be revealed to be true.
And if it is true, then the intuitionist will need a more nuanced response to Sinnott-Armstrong.

2.4 Rejecting the internalist bias
A first attempt to respond to Sinnott-Armstrong might involve rejecting the internalist
bias in his argument (Shafer-Landau 2008). The argument from cognitive biases assumes that
under conditions in which a believer has reason to believe that her moral intuitions are
unreliable, she must confirm those intuitions to be justified. The intuitions might indeed have
been formed reliably, and reliably track the moral truth; but if one believes that this is not the
case, then, for Sinnott-Armstrong, an internalist clause must be applied and she must confirm the
intuition to be justified. The uncompromising externalist can simply reject this internalist clause;
even when a person has reason to doubt the reliability of her intuitions, if they are, in fact,
formed reliably, then they are justified—without any need for confirmation. This seems to me to
be a perfectly sound way to reject the argument from cognitive biases. But it requires that one
adopt an uncompromising externalist moral epistemology. For those who are externalists of a
more compromising sort, or who are not externalists at all, rejecting the internalist bias will not
work. I will attempt to offer a response to the argument from cognitive biases that does not
require one to adopt any particular moral epistemology. The argument from cognitive biases
fails, I believe, on a much more fundamental level than its epistemological assumptions—it fails
even granting Sinnott-Armstrong’s internalist clause.
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3 The argument from disagreement
The argument from disagreement is one of the most common arguments against
intuitionism (Mackie 1977; Loeb 1998; Sinnott-Armstrong 2002, 2006a, 2006b), and in this
section I will suggest that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument from cognitive biases is simply a fresh
take on this old argument (2008a); the argument from cognitive biases attacks intuitionism based
on inconsistent intuitions within a single subject across different circumstances, while the
argument from disagreement attacks intuitionism based on inconsistent intuitions between
different subjects. With this in mind, I will spend some time in this section reviewing the
argument from disagreement and the intuitionist’s response from the non-moral basis of moral
disagreement, which I will adapt as a response to the argument from cognitive biases in Section
4.
Recall that the argument from cognitive biases cites the prevalence of cognitive biases, or
within-subject moral disagreements, to argue that moral intuitions are unreliable, must be
confirmed to be justified, and can only be inferentially justified—and thus that moral
intuitionism is false. Similarly, the argument from disagreement cites the prevalence of moral
disagreements (or inconsistencies) between-subjects to argue that moral intuitions are unreliable,
must be confirmed to be justified, and can only be inferentially justified—and thus that
intuitionism is false (2008a). The only difference between the argument from disagreement and
the argument from cognitive biases is that the unreliability of moral intuitions is due to moral
disagreement, rather than cognitive biases. To make clear the parallel with the argument from
cognitive biases, the argument from disagreement looks like this:
D1) If moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable, then moral intuitions
must be confirmed in order to be justified (because without
confirmation, a believer is not justified in believing her
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intuitions were formed reliably rather than unreliably, and thus
she is not justified in believing those intuitions).
D2) If moral intuitions must be confirmed in order to be justified,
then they can only be justified inferentially.
D3) If moral intuitions can only be justified inferentially, then
moral intuitionism is false.
D4) Moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable.15
D5) Moral intuitionism is false. 16
Each of these premises was discussed in detail above, in relation to the argument from
cognitive biases. Again, the only difference is that cognitive biases have now been replaced by
moral disagreement; within-subject disagreement has been replaced by between-subject
disagreement. The point of the argument remains the same. Moral intuitions are unreliable
because of the prevalence of some sort of disagreement, in this case between-subject moral
disagreement. Thus, intuitions must be confirmed to be justified—and confirmation justifies only
inferentially. So moral intuitions must be justified inferentially if they are to be justified at all,
and moral intuitionism is false; moral intuitions cannot be justified non-inferentially. The
prevalence of moral disagreement is supposed to show that moral intuitionism is false in the
same way that the prevalence of cognitive biases of moral intuitions was supposed to show that
intuitionism is false.

15

One might argue that moral disagreement, by itself, does not need to be sufficiently prevalent to make moral
intuitions unreliable, but rather disagreement might be just one of several sources of unreliability that, together,
make moral intuitions reliable (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006a). Thus, it may be that for moral disagreement to present a
problem for moral intuitionism it need not be so prevalent as to bring moral intuitions’ reliability into question; it
need only be prevalent enough to do so in combination with other sources of unreliability. I actually think that other
sources of reliability can be reduced to forms of disagreement, and thus that this way of arguing would reduce to the
argument from disagreement.
16
This is my formulation of the argument, which has been reconstructed from Mackie 1977, Sinnott-Armstrong
2006, and Machery et al. 2005. I have formulated it in this way to make clear the parallel with the argument from
cognitive biases.
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3.1 Non-moral basis of moral disagreement
The intuitionist’s classic response to the argument from disagreement is to argue that
most moral disputes are not genuine (based solely on disagreement about the moral facts), they
are derived—they are grounded in disagreement about non-moral facts. David Brink says that
most “moral disputes are in principle resolvable” because they are grounded in “resolvable
disagreements over the non-moral facts” (Brink 1984). That is, moral disputes can be resolved
without moral confirmation; they can be resolved by resolving the non-moral disagreements that
the moral disputes are based on. In this vein, Richard Boyd suggests, perhaps overly
optimistically, that “careful examination will reveal…that agreement on nonmoral issues would
eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts of moral issues which arise in ordinary moral
practice” (1988, p. 123). People disagree about non-moral facts like reincarnation, the ability of
animals to feel pain, and the long-term consequences of actions—and disagreements in moral
intuitions often are based on disagreements in such non-moral issues. And this is important
because moral disagreement grounded in non-moral disagreement would not threaten moral
intuitionism, since such disagreement could be resolved without making the moral intuitions
inferable. Once the non-moral disagreement is resolved, the reliability of moral intuitions would
not be called into question; at least not on the basis of moral disagreement—since there would be
no moral disagreement once its grounding non-moral disagreement is cleared up. Thus, the moral
intuitions could (potentially) be justified non-inferentially (so long as there was no other reason
to question their reliability); the argument from disagreement would not have force against
intuitionism if moral disagreement is derived. There may be other arguments that do have force,
but if moral disagreements are derived, and not genuine, then the argument from disagreement
would not threaten intuitionism.
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More specifically, if non-moral disagreements (disagreements about non-moral facts) are
the basis for most moral disagreements, then premise D1 would be false; the unreliability of
moral intuitions due to moral disagreement would not show that moral intuitions must be
confirmed for them to be justified. The unreliability of moral intuitions due to moral
disagreement which is grounded in non-moral disagreement shows that either people’s moral
intuitions or their relevant non-moral beliefs must be confirmed to allow their moral intuitions to
be justified. 17 This is because moral disputes based on non-moral disputes can be resolved by
confirming the moral intuitions—which would justify those moral intuitions inferentially—or the
non-moral ones—which would not justify the moral intuitions, but would remove the need to
inferentially justify them that was created by the moral disagreement (since the moral
disagreement would dissolve once its grounding non-moral disagreement is resolved).
As an example, recall the world in which half of the population believes that water
boarding is morally wrong and half believes it is right. Now imagine that this moral
disagreement is grounded in a non-moral disagreement, like a disagreement about the average
effectiveness of water boarding in getting accurate information out of terrorism suspects.
Suppose that one half of people believe that water boarding is wrong only because it is
ineffective in getting information, while the other half believes it is right only because it is
effective in getting information. Now imagine that it is determined that water boarding is, in fact,
completely ineffective in getting accurate information out of enemies. In this case, everyone in
the world will agree that water boarding is wrong, since half of the population thought it was
right only because they (wrongly) believed it to be effective in getting information. The key is
that since the moral disagreement is grounded in non-moral disagreement, the moral
disagreement and unreliability of moral intuitions could be resolved by resolving the non-moral
17

The relevant non-moral beliefs are the ones responsible for the moral disagreement.
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disagreement and unreliability of non-moral beliefs; only the non-moral beliefs (about the
effectiveness of torture) were confirmed, yet the moral disagreement is resolved. After the nonmoral disagreement was resolved, there remained no moral disagreement that could bring the
reliability of people’s moral beliefs into question and could demand confirmation of them. Thus,
while the moral disagreement is sufficiently widespread to bring the reliability of people’s moral
intuitions about water boarding into doubt, their moral intuitions did not need to be confirmed
for them to be justified; confirmation of their non-moral beliefs cleared up the moral
disagreement and, accordingly, cleared up questions of the reliability of their moral intuitions.
The non-moral confirmation does not itself justify the moral beliefs, but it removes the need for
inferential justification that was created by the moral disagreement. (There may very well be
other reasons inferential justification is required, but moral disagreement would not be one of
them—since no moral disagreement would exist after the non-moral confirmation is provided.)
Moral confirmation could have been provided to clear up the moral disagreement—if they
somehow discovered that, in fact, water boarding is wrong—but none was required. Thus,
premise D1 as stated is false. While, as the antecedent of premise D1 suggests, moral
disagreement in our imagined world was sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions
(about water boarding) are, in general, unreliable, contrary to the consequent of premise D1, this
entailed that either the moral or non-moral beliefs needed confirmation in order for the moral
intuitions to be justified.
To be clear, if most moral disagreement turns out to be derived, or based on non-moral
disagreement, this would not show that only non-moral beliefs are unreliable instead of moral
intuitions. 18 That is, it would not show that premise D4 and the antecedent of premise D1 are

18

By “most moral disagreements”, I mean that enough moral disagreements are grounded in non-moral
disagreements so that the reliability of moral intuitions, in general, cannot be called into question by the amount of
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false. Derived moral disagreement still shows that moral intuitions are unreliable, because the
same amount of the intuitions are accurate and the same amount remain inaccurate—there is still
moral disagreement, after all. All it shows is that moral intuitions depend on unreliable nonmoral beliefs for their formation. In this way, derived moral disagreement would suggests that
premise D1 is false; sufficient disagreement in moral intuitions such that the intuitions are
unreliable would not entail that the moral intuitions must be confirmed to be justified, but only
that either the moral intuitions or the non-moral beliefs must be confirmed.
It may seem that premise D1 could simply be amended to premise D1`, which states that
if moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions are, in general,
unreliable, then moral intuitions or the relevant non-moral beliefs require confirmation in order
for moral intuitions to be justified. By adopting this move, however, we lose the connection
between premises D1` and D2; the consequent of premise D1` states that moral intuitions or nonmoral beliefs require confirmation for moral intuitions to be justified, while the antecedent of
premise D2 refers to only moral intuitions requiring confirmation for them to be justified. And
premise D2 is false when its connection with premise D1` is restored by amending it to D2`,
which states that if moral intuitions or non-moral beliefs require confirmation for moral
intuitions to be justified, then moral intuitions are justified only inferentially. This is because
non-moral confirmation (i.e. confirmation of one’s non-moral beliefs) does not justify moral
intuitions inferentially—it does not allow one to infer her moral intuitions from the non-moral
confirming evidence of her non-moral beliefs.19 As it relates to the example above, people in our

moral disagreement that is not grounded in non-moral disagreement—that is, enough moral disagreements are
grounded in non-moral disagreements so that the solely moral disagreement that remains is not sufficiently prevalent
to make premise 4 true.
19
I may sometimes say that the non-moral confirmation ‘justifies the moral intuitions’—but by this I mean that the
confirmation removes any reason to question the intuitions reliability, and thus (barring some other reason to reject
the intuitions), moral intuitions are justified.
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imagined world cannot infer from the non-moral confirmation of the ineffectiveness of torture to
the normative claim that torture is wrong, on pain of inferring an ought from an is. 20 Still, the
non-moral confirmation cleared up the source of the unreliability of the moral disagreement, and
thus allows the moral intuitions to be justified. While the non-moral confirmation does not make
the intuitions justified, it removes the requirement of moral confirmation for the intuitions’
justification—and it does so without making them inferable from the confirming evidence. There
may be other reasons that moral intuitions are unreliable and require confirmation to be justified,
but moral disagreement would no longer be one of them if that disagreement is derived.
To make D2` true, it would have to read that if moral intuitions or non-moral beliefs must
be confirmed for moral intuitions to be justified, then, moral intuitions could be justified either
inferentially or non-inferentially. However, such a conclusion (stated in the consequent), clearly
poses no threat to intuitionism. Moral intuitionism holds that some moral intuitions can be
justified non-inferentially, and the conclusion above allows for such non-inferential justification.
In this way, the availability of non-moral confirmation as a way of resolving moral
disagreements would allow the intuitionist to say that moral disagreement does not threaten the
non-inferential justification of moral intuitions—under conditions in which the non-moral
disagreement has been resolved, or under ‘ideal conditions’. This is the thesis of what I will call
a moderate moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially
justified under ideal conditions. So, if most moral disagreements are grounded in non-moral
disagreements, then the argument from disagreement against a moderate moral intuitionism fails
because premise D1 is false, and making premise D1 true by amending it to D1` yields a
conclusion to the argument from disagreement that has no force against intuitionism. Moral
disagreement may be widespread, but if most of it is grounded in non-moral disagreement then it
20

This is the problem that Hume made famous in A Treatise of Human Nature (Book III, Part I, Section I).
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does not show that most moral intuitions must be confirmed to be justified, and that intuitionism
is false. Rather, it would show that either moral intuitions or the relevant non-moral intuitions
require confirmation, and thus leave the door open for moderate intuitionism (a thesis which I
think would be perfectly acceptable to most intuitionists, and quite objectionable to their critics,
like Sinnott-Armstrong).
So the unreliability of moral intuitions due to moral disagreement creates the need for
confirmation of one’s moral intuitions for them to be justified only if the moral disagreement is
not grounded in non-moral disagreement. That is, premise D1 is true only when the cited moral
disagreement is genuine—i.e. is not grounded in non-moral disagreement. Thus, for the
argument from disagreement to go through, it requires an additional premise:
The relevant moral disagreement is genuine—that is, not grounded
in non-moral disagreement (disagreement about non-moral facts).
So we can now formulate a revised argument from disagreement:
D1*) If moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable, and moral
disagreement is not grounded in non-moral disagreement,
then moral intuitions require confirmation in order to be
justified (because without such confirmation, a believer is
not justified in believing her intuitions were formed reliably
rather than unreliably, and thus she is not justified in
believing those intuitions).
D2*) If moral intuitions require confirmation in order to be
justified, then they can only be justified inferentially.
D3*) If moral intuitions can only be justified inferentially, then
moral intuitionism is false.
D4a*) Moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable.21
21

One might argue that moral disagreement, by itself, does not need to be sufficiently prevalent to make moral
intuitions unreliable, but rather disagreement might be just one of several sources of unreliability that, together,
make moral intuitions reliable (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006). Thus, it may be that for moral disagreement to present a
problem for moral intuitionism it need not be so prevalent as to bring moral intuitions’ reliability into question; it
need only be prevalent enough to do so in combination with other sources of unreliability. I actually think that other
sources of reliability can be reduced to forms of disagreement, and thus that this way of arguing would reduce to the
argument from disagreement.
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D4b*) The moral disagreement cited in 4a`` is genuine—that is,
not grounded in non-moral disagreement (disagreement
about non-moral facts.
D5*) Moral intuitionism is false.
Note that D4a* is the same as D4, and that D1* is the same as D1, with the addition of D4b* to
its antecedent. By genuine moral disagreement, I just mean moral disagreement that is not
grounded in non-moral disagreement (which I will call derived moral disagreement). After the
argument is properly amended in this way, we see how the intuitionist’s objection from the nonmoral basis of moral disagreement works—by rejecting premise D4b*. For example, David
Brink argues that “a great many moral disagreements depend upon disagreements over the nonmoral facts”—that is, moral intuitions would converge under ideal conditions, in which the nonmoral facts are agreed upon (1984). In contrast, adherents to the argument from disagreement
suggest that non-moral disagreement is not sufficient to explain the overwhelming prevalence of
moral disagreement (Machery, Kelly, and Stich 2005; Doris and Stich 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong
2006a and 2008a; Brandt 1959). Doris and Stich argue for “pessimistic conclusions regarding the
possibility of convergence in moral judgment”; few, if any moral intuitions would converge in
ideal conditions (when non-moral facts are agreed upon), and thus disagreement in moral
intuitions is not typically grounded in non-moral disagreement. But Loeb conservatively advises
more serious empirical investigation into whether or not and how many moral disagreements are
grounded non-moral disagreements before assessing the argument from disagreement and the
objection from the non-moral basis of moral disagreement (Loeb 1998). These perspectives will
be important to keep in mind in what follows, as I adapt the intuitionist’s objection from the nonmoral basis of disagreement to object to the argument from cognitive biases on the grounds of
the non-moral basis of cognitive biases.
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4 Non-moral basis of cognitive biases of moral intuitions
In what follows, I will attempt to adapt the response from the non-moral basis of moral
disagreement that the intuitionist offered against the argument from disagreement. This response
held that most moral disagreements are derived from non-moral disagreements, and thus can be
resolved by either moral or non-moral confirmation. Since moral intuitions were deemed
unreliable in premise D4a* because of the prevalence of moral disagreement, once the moral
disagreement is cleared up by clearing up the non-moral disagreement, there is no reason to think
that moral intuitions are unreliable. In this way, non-moral confirmation (i.e. confirmation of
non-moral judgments) can allow moral intuitions to be justified by removing the moral
disagreement (which was grounded in the non-moral disagreement). It does not make them
justified, but it rebuts the argument from disagreement because it prevents moral intuitions’
reliability from being called into question on the grounds of moral disagreement. And the key is
that non-moral confirmation does this without making subjects able infer their moral intuitions
from the confirming evidence that cleared up the moral disagreement, since that confirmation
was non-moral confirmation of their non-moral judgments, and one cannot infer a moral intuition
from non-moral evidence. For this reason, the argument from disagreement needed to be
amended to include the premise that the moral disagreement is genuine—i.e. not grounded in
non-moral disagreement. The intuitionist then rejects the amended argument from disagreement
by rejecting this additional premise and holding that most moral disagreement is derived from
disagreement in non-moral judgments.
In Section 4.1 I will reformulate the argument from cognitive biases to include the insight
that the disagreements (in this case within-subject, cognitive biases) must be genuine. In 4.2 I
adapt the response from the non-moral basis of moral disagreement to respond to the argument
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from cognitive biases, arguing for the non-moral basis of cognitive biases. Then in Section 4.3 I
will discuss some replies to this objection suggested by Sinnott-Armstrong. In the end, I believe
that more and better designed experiments can resolve this dispute, and in Section 5 I will
present an initial experiment I have conducted in collaboration with Eddy Nahmias that weighs
in favor of the intuitionist’s response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases.

4.1 Revised argument from cognitive biases
Recall that the only difference between the argument from cognitive biases and the
argument from disagreement is that the unreliability of moral intuitions is due to cognitive
biases, rather than moral disagreement. So we should expect unreliability due to cognitive biases
to have the same limitation as unreliability due to moral disagreement; namely, that if cognitive
biases of moral intuitions are grounded in biases of non-moral judgments (i.e. if the cognitive
biases of moral intuitions are derived), then those biases would not threaten intuitionism since
they can be resolved by non-moral confirmation. Thus, we can formulate a revised argument
from cognitive biases:
C1*) If moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive
biases to show that moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable,
and those cognitive biases are not grounded in biases of nonmoral beliefs, then moral intuitions must be confirmed in
order to be justified (because without confirmation, a believer
is not justified in believing her intuitions were formed reliably
rather than unreliably, and thus she is not justified in believing
those intuitions)
C2*) If moral intuitions require confirmation in order to be
justified, then they can only be justified inferentially.
C3*) If moral intuitions can only be justified inferentially, then
moral intuitionism is false.
C4a*) Moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive biases
to show that moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable.
C4b*) The cognitive biases cited in C4a are genuine—that is, not
grounded in biases of non-moral judgments (biases of people’s
beliefs or intuitions about non-moral facts).
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C5*) Moral intuitionism is false
This revised argument has added premise C4b*, which holds that the cognitive biases
cited in the argument must not be grounded in biases of non-moral judgments, and has also
added that proposition to the antecedent of C1. The reason is the same as it was for adding
premise D4b* to the revised argument from disagreement. Moral inconsistency is what brings
the reliability of moral intuitions into question in the first place, and what accordingly drives the
arguments against intuitionism from disagreement and cognitive biases. If the inconsistencies in
moral intuitions cited in these arguments are grounded in inconsistencies in non-moral beliefs or
intuitions, then clearing up the non-moral difference would dissolve the moral inconsistency.
And the key is that it would dissolve the moral inconsistency without providing inferential
justification of the moral intuitions (since one could not infer her moral intuitions from the nonmoral confirmation; see Section 3.1 for more on this).

4.2 Non-moral basis of biases
Recall that the argument from disagreement is based on between-subject differences in
moral intuitions, while the argument from cognitive biases is based on within-subject differences
in moral intuitions (e.g. the same subject would have different intuitions about different
presentations of objectively equivalent moral dilemmas or scenarios). The objection from the
non-moral basis of moral disagreement rejects premise D4b* in the argument from disagreement
by holding that much moral disagreement is derived, or based on non-moral disagreement; that
is, many differences in moral intuitions between-subjects are grounded in differences non-moral
judgments between-subjects. Analogously, this response can be adapted to respond to the
argument from cognitive biases by rejecting premise C4b*, and holding that the cognitive biases
of moral intuitions are derived; that is, many differences in a single subject’s moral intuitions
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(about objectively equivalent dilemmas presented in different ways) are grounded in differences
in that subject’s non-moral judgments 22 (about the objectively equivalent dilemmas presented in
different ways). This response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases suggests that a given
subject makes different non-moral judgments about a scenario when the scenario is framed in
different ways, and it is largely on the basis of this difference in non-moral judgments that the
subject forms different moral intuitions about the scenario framed in different ways.
Accordingly, I contend that many of the cognitive biases of subjects’ moral intuitions are
grounded in biases of their non-moral judgments in this way. By “many”, I mean that enough
cognitive biases of moral intuitions are derived (i.e. grounded in non-moral biases) such that any
remaining genuine biases of moral intuitions are not sufficient to call into question the reliability
of the class of moral intuitions under ideal conditions, or when non-moral biases are not present.
As an example, consider how non-moral biases might ground the moral biases found in
Petrinovich and O’Neill’s trolley dilemma. Subjects were more likely to say that flipping the
switch is appropriate in the Save wording than in the Kill wording. The response from the nonmoral basis of cognitive biases suggests that a significant part of the reason that subjects respond
differently to the Kill and Save wordings is because they make different non-moral judgments
about the scenario depending on the wording used. When framed in terms of the people that will
be killed, a subject’s options are:
“Throw the switch which will result in the death of the one
innocent person on the side track.” (Petrinovich and O’Neill 1996)
One possibility is that when presented with this Kill wording, the emphasis in that
wording on the killing of the one person on the side track makes it likely that subjects will form
the non-moral judgment that throwing the switch will be very likely to kill the one person, but
22

Recall that these differences in non-moral judgments are not necessarily consciously formed–they may be
subconscious and may be easily changed. For example, they might fluctuate when the context changes, when new
information becomes available, or even when the subject’s attention focuses on new aspects of the scenario.
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might fail to save the five people on the main track (i.e. will be a futile attempt to save the five
people). This is because the Kill wording explicitly highlights the fact that the one will be killed,
but does not mention what will happen to the five. And if throwing the switch, killing one
person, is not going to save the five people, then it makes perfect sense not to throw the switch.
Similarly, subjects may be less likely to make these judgments when presented with the Save
wording:
“Throw the switch, which will result in the five innocent people on
the main track being saved.” (Petrinovich and O’Neill 1996)
When subjects read this Save wording, they may be more likely to make the non-moral
judgment that flipping the switch will, in fact, save the five people on the main track (after all,
that is exactly what it says). Such a non-moral judgment might at least partially explain why
subjects who read the Save wording were more likely to endorse flipping the switch—because
they were more likely to judge that flipping the switch would save the five people. Furthermore,
the Save wording may have made it less likely that subjects would believe that flipping the
switch would kill the one person (after all, the question asking if it is appropriate to flip the
switch says that the five will be saved, but makes no mention of the one person being killed); in
contrast, the Kill wording might have the opposite effect, making it more likely that subjects
would believe that flipping the switch would kill the one person (after all, the question says that
the one will be killed, but makes no mention of the five being saved).
Also, Petrinovich and O’Neil reported that subjects were more likely to disagree with not
flipping the switch in Kill than in Save. This again may be explained by the fact that not flipping
the switch is described as resulting in the five people on the main track dying in Kill, while
resulting in the one person on the side track being saved in Save. The non-moral facts are the
same in both Kill and Save—if the switch is not flipped, the one person on the side track will live
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in Kill, and the five people on the main track will die in Save. But these different frames
highlight different non-moral facts of the dilemma, and thus are likely to result in subjects
making different non-moral judgments about the dilemma in the two different presentations (Kill
versus Save). And the key is that their different non-moral judgments may explain why they
formed different moral intuitions. They saw the non-moral facts of the case differently in the two
conditions, and moral intuitions are formed based on the non-moral facts as one sees them.
Or perhaps, more simply, non-moral judgments may be biased because subjects’ attention
in Save is subconsciously focused on the fact that flipping the switch would save five people.
They may not even be aware they that are paying more attention to certain facts of the case. But
nonetheless, their non-moral judgments about the case may be subconsciously influenced by
their attention being focused on saving the five people rather than killing the one person—and
the differences in their moral intuitions could be explained by this difference in non-moral
intuitions. It is true that if asked about whether the trolley would kill the one person, they could
probably easily report that it would, because the question would refocus their attention from the
fact that flipping the switch would save the five people to a different aspect of the case (viz.
whether or not flipping the switch would kill the one person). And when attending to this other
fact people will probably be able to report it accurately. But it is subjects’ non-moral judgments
about the non-moral facts of the case when they form their moral intuition that are relevant—and
the different frames likely modify their non-moral judgments about the facts of the case
(subconsciously, and perhaps only for a short time) by focusing their attention on certain facts of
the case rather than others.
We should note that subjects are supposed to base their responses on exactly what the
scenario says. Since it says in the Save scenario (even if not in the description of the options) that
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flipping the switch will result in the death of the one person on the side track, then that fact
should be what subjects base their judgments on. But what is important in determining the basis
of the cognitive biases effects on moral intuitions is not what subjects are supposed to base their
responses on, but what they, in fact, do base their responses on. Thus, again, what is relevant is
the non-moral judgments that subjects actually have in mind when they offer their moral
judgments. And it is likely that those judgments are not true to the facts of the scenario, but are
affected by the way the scenario is presented.
The main problem with the response to the argument from disagreement from the nonmoral basis of disagreement is that it suggests that most moral beliefs are virtually universally
agreed upon, and that for most moral disagreements people actually agree about the moral
principles and what is morally at stake, they just disagree about the facts of the case at hand. This
seems like a rather unlikely consequence of the response from the non-moral basis of
disagreement; it seems reasonable (to many philosophers, myself included) that many moral
disagreements are genuine moral disagreements, rather than mere derived moral disagreements
actually based on disagreement about the non-moral facts of the case (Machery et al. 2005; Doris
and Stich 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong 2006a and 2008a; Brandt 1959)
The response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases does not seem as susceptible
to an analogous problem. It seems very likely that part of ordinary moral psychology is a form of
moral supervenience, where moral facts are taken to supervene on non-moral facts. That is, it
seems likely that most people hold that if two cases do not differ in their non-moral properties,
then they do not differ in their moral properties. Surely most people subscribe to such a thesis. 23
Surely people are surprised to find out about the cognitive biases of moral intuitions discussed
above; if the dilemmas are objectively equivalent, obviously they should be judged the same.
23

This statement is ripe for experimental investigation.
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Such supervenience seems as obvious to me as the wrongness of killing children for fun. At the
very least, it seems far more likely that people do ascribe to the thesis of moral supervenience
than reject it. And if one agrees that people probably ascribe to moral supervenience, then it
seems strained to think that within-subject differences in moral intuitions are grounded in
anything other than within-subject differences in non-moral judgments; since people subscribe to
the thesis of moral supervenience, the same person should have different moral intuitions about
the same scenario only if she made different non-moral judgments about that scenario.
Admittedly, this is a statement about how people’s intuitions should behave—but by should here,
I mean not only that rationality demands intuitions to behave in this way, but also that we should
expect that, upon empirical investigation, people’s intuitions actually do behave in this way. If
most people do ascribe to the thesis of moral supervenience, then we should expect that
empirical probing will show that cognitive biases of moral intuitions occur only (or mostly)
when biases of non-moral judgments also occur.
Once it is established that many cognitive biases of moral intuitions are grounded in
biases of non-moral intuitions, the response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases follows
the same route at the response from the non-moral basis of moral disagreement. Since cognitive
biases of moral intuitions are due to biases of non-moral intuitions, they can be resolved by
either moral or non-moral confirmation. Thus, premise C1 is false because the unreliability of
moral intuitions does not imply that moral confirmation is required for a moral intuition to be
justified—only that either moral or non-moral confirmation is required. The non-moral
confirmation would not itself justify the moral intuitions, but it would remove the cognitive
biases and unreliability of moral intuitions since those biases were based on biases and
unreliability of non-moral judgments, and the non-moral judgments are not unreliable once they
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are confirmed. In this way, non-moral confirmation of non-moral beliefs allows moral intuitions
to be justified, and it does so without making people able to infer their moral intuitions from the
non-moral confirmation (again, refer to Section 3.1 for more on why this is so).

4.3 An initial objection and a response
Before moving on to more empirical discussions, consider Sinnott-Armstrong’s initial
response to the idea that within-subject differences in moral intuitions are grounded in non-moral
differences. He says that the “changes in [a subject’s] moral belief [described in the research on
framing effects] cannot be due to changes in the facts of the case, because consequences,
knowledge, intention, and other facts are held constant” (2008a, 67). Sinnott-Armstrong is
almost anticipating the response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases; however, it is not
non-moral differences in the stimuli that are relevant (since, as he notes, there are not any
relevant non-moral differences in the stimuli). Rather, it is differences in subjects’ non-moral
judgments about the stimuli that are relevant.
Sinnott-Armstrong does, however, anticipate a sort of objection from the non-moral basis
of cognitive biases of moral intuitions, but it seems that he fails to appreciate its force. He says
that in the relevant empirical studies, the “descriptions of the cases were admittedly incomplete,
so subjects might have filled in gaps in different ways” (2008a, 67). That is, the biases of moral
intuitions might be due to the fact that subjects fill in the unspecified non-moral facts of the case
in different ways. But he responds to this point by saying that “moral intuitions would still be
unreliable. Wording and context would still lead to conflict moral judgments about a single
description of a scenario” (2008a, 69). Since they are unreliable, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, they
still demand confirmation to be confirmed.
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However, he fails to note that the confirmation the unreliable moral intuitions would
demand can be non-moral confirmation of the non-moral judgments—which would remove the
biases of moral intuitions without making the intuitions inferable from the confirmation. This is
why I have gone out of my way to show the parallels between the argument from cognitive
biases and the argument from moral disagreement; because it is widely agreed that if moral
disagreement is based on non-moral disagreement, then the argument from moral disagreement
would have no force against the intuitionist. According to Sinnott-Armstrong himself, “when
disagreements about moral issues arise solely from non-moral disagreements and conceptual
confusions that could be removed by further inquiry and reflection, informed and rational people
would not disagree” (2002). Such derived moral disagreements do not present a serious threat to
intuitionism because all the intuitionist needs to claim is that moral intuitions can be noninferentially justified once the non-moral disagreement is cleared up. And the argument from
cognitive biases is just the argument from disagreement redone, with the between-subject
disagreement being replaced with within-subject disagreement. Thus, we should expect that it
faces a similar restriction; if cognitive biases of moral intuitions are grounded in biases of nonmoral intuitions, then the argument from cognitive biases does not threaten (a moderate form of)
moral intuitionism. And I have argued that it fails to meet this restriction. Cognitive biases of
moral intuitions are likely grounded in biases of non-moral intuitions.
At the very least, it should be clear by now that the response from the non-moral basis of
cognitive biases cannot be easily dismissed. What is needed to evaluate the response is an
empirical exploration of people’s moral intuitions and how they are related to their non-moral
intuitions—are biases of moral intuitions based on biases of non-moral intuitions? In this vein, in
Section 5 I will discuss an initial study that Eddy Nahmias and I conducted which suggests that
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people’s non-moral intuitions about the believability of certain outcomes stipulated in a moral
dilemma have a significant influence on their moral intuitions about the dilemma.
5 Empirical support for the intuitionist’s reply
The studies cited in Sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.4 fail to determine whether or not the
cognitive biases of moral intuitions that they reveal are genuine or derived from biases of nonmoral intuitions. To initially examine this point, I conducted a survey study in collaboration with
Eddy Nahmias in which we probed people’s moral intuitions about a novel battery of moral
dilemmas, and also examined their non-moral judgments about the dilemmas. There were two
primary questions this study was designed to answer: (i) is there a self-other bias in moral
intuitions about personal moral dilemmas? And (ii) are differences in people’s moral intuitions
correlated with differences in their non-moral judgments about a dilemma. While Nadelhoffer
and Feltz found a self-other bias using impersonal dilemmas, we found no self-other bias using
personal dilemmas, suggesting that the self-other biasing of moral intuitions should be further
probed to determine the reliability of these findings and the nature of the self-other bias of moral
intuitions before this bias is used to argue against intuitionism. Also, we found that non-moral
judgments predict subjects’ moral intuitions across a variety of moral dilemmas, which suggests
that differences in moral intuitions about moral dilemmas might be grounded in biases of
subjects’ non-moral judgments—differences in subjects’ moral intuitions about different, but
objectively equivalent presentations of a moral dilemma might be due to differences in their nonmoral judgments about the different presentations of the dilemma. Much more work will need to
be done to continue to evaluate this claim.
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5.1 Methods
Two different surveys, Survey 1 (N=210) and Survey 2 (N=187), each consisting of 8
different personal moral dilemmas 24 (making a total of 16 different dilemmas), 25 were presented
to Georgia State undergraduates enrolled in psychology and philosophy courses using Question
Pro (an online survey program). Here is one of the dilemmas, nicknamed Underwater Hatch: 26
You are the director of an underwater research facility. There has
been an explosion and water is pouring into the facility, causing all
of the doors to begin closing automatically. You and six other
researchers are in a room that is being sealed off by a closing door.
At the last minute, someone in the hall tries to make it to safety in
the room by sliding under the closing door, but he is too late and
the door closes on his arm, trapping him outside and making it
impossible for him to get into the room. This also prevents the
door from closing and allows water to rush into the room.
If nothing is done, the water will flood the room and drown you
and everyone else inside, including the person trapped under the
door. The only way to save you and the other researchers is for you
(the facility director) to cut the trapped person’s arm off with an
axe, leaving him out in the hallway where he will drown, allowing
the door to close and preventing the room from flooding.
After reading the dilemma, subjects were asked the moral question:
M) How appropriate is it for you to chop the trapped person’s arm
off, leaving him out in the hallway where he will drown in order to
save yourself and the six other researchers in the room?
They rated the appropriateness of the action on a 6-point Likert scale with no zero, with -3 being
completely inappropriate and +3 being completely appropriate.

24

I follow Green et. al (2001) in defining a personal moral dilemma as a dilemma in which the action in question
“(a) could reasonably be expected to lead to serious bodily harm (b) to a particular person or a member or members
of a particular group of people (c) where this harm is not the result of deflecting an existing threat onto a different
party.”
25
See Appendix A for the full text of all of the dilemmas. You will notice that the dilemmas were constructed to
vary on a variety of dimensions within the context of a personal moral dilemma. For example, some involve
personally killing a family member, killing in various ways (drowning, shooting, etc.). which will not be separately
analyzed here. These will be ignored for the purposes of this paper, but will present an interesting area for deeper
exploration of the data.
26
None of the surveys that subjects completed included the dilemmas’ nicknames or the question labels (e.g. M or
L1).
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To probe their non-moral judgments about the scenario, subjects were then asked two
“likeliness” questions. They rated how likely they thought two stipulated outcomes of the
scenario were on a 5-point scale, with zero being “not likely at all” and 4 being “definitely will
happen”. The judgments subjects express in response to these questions are judgments about
probabilities of potential consequences of performing, or not performing, the action described in
the scenario, and thus they are judgments about the non-moral facts of the case. The first
likeliness question asked what subjects thought about the outcome of not performing the
proposed action as stipulated in the scenario:
L1) If you do NOT chop the trapped person’s arm off, how likely
do you think it is that the room will flood and you, the six other
researchers in the room, and the trapped person will drown?
The consequent here is what the scenario says will happen if “you do not chop the trapped
person’s arm off”; so the question is asking how much you believe what the scenario says will
happen. The second likeliness question asked what subjects thought about the stipulated outcome
of performing the action:
L2) If you DO chop the trapped person’s arm off, how likely do
you think it is that the door will seal and you and the six other
researchers in the room will be safe, while the trapped person will
drown outside?
Again, subjects are being asked how much they believe what the scenario says will happen.
Lastly, subjects were asked a Yes/No comprehension question, to detect if they were
paying attention to relevant details of the scenario:
In this scenario, is the research facility flooding with water?
To look for a self-other bias within these personal dilemmas, each of the two surveys, 1
and 2, presented subjects with 4 dilemmas in the Self condition (where the subject was the
proposed actor, as in Underwater Hatch above) and 4 dilemmas in the Other condition (where
another person, e.g. “John”, was the proposed actor). And there were two versions of each
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survey, such that the two versions had opposite dilemmas in the Self and Other conditions. So for
Survey 1, version A, 4 dilemmas were in the Self condition, and 4 in the Other condition—and
for Survey 1, version B, those same dilemmas were placed in the opposite condition (and
similarly for the 8 dilemmas of Survey 2). Thus, each of the 16 dilemmas was in the Self
condition in one version of a survey, and in the Other condition in another version of that survey.
To control for order effects, each survey version (A and B) consisted of two blocks (X
and Y) of 4 dilemmas. The blocks consisted of 2 Self and 2 Other dilemmas quasi-randomized to
alternate between Self and Other dilemmas. Within a given survey version, one block began with
a Self dilemma, while the other block began with an Other dilemma. So, consider Survey 1,
version A. Half of subjects saw the following order of dilemmas, the other half reversed the two
blocks: Block X (Dilemma 1 [Self], Dilemma 2 [Other], Dilemma 3 [Self], Dilemma 4 [ Other]),
Block Y (Dilemma 5 [Other], Dilemma 6 [Self], Dilemma 7 [Other], Dilemma 8 [Self]). Survey
1, version B presented the exact same dilemmas in the same orders, except that each dilemma
was flipped between the Self and Other conditions. Survey 2 (versions A and B) followed the
same pattern, except with Dilemmas 9-16.

5.2 Results and analyses
Subjects who missed more than two of the eight comprehension questions on their survey
were excluded from the analyses (Survey 1, 24 excluded; Survey 2, 19 excluded). Also, subjects
who took more than 60 minutes or less than 5 minutes were excluded, because it is likely that
they were not taking the survey all at once, or were moving through the survey without actively
participating (an additional 8 from Survey 1, and 5 from Survey 2). So for the analyses, there
were 168 subjects in Survey 1 and 161 subjects in Survey 2.

54
To determine if there was an effect of the Self versus Other conditions on moral
responses (to question M), independent samples t-tests (two-tailed) were performed on each of
the dilemmas, comparing moral judgments across conditions. There were no significant
differences in moral responses between the Self and Other conditions for any of the 16 moral
dilemmas.
To determine if subjects’ non-moral judgments predict their moral intuitions, three
separate multiple regression analyses were performed on each dilemma (the data is presented in
Appendix A). The following background factors were controlled for in all of the regression
analyses (and were entered in the regression equations in this order): gender, whether the
subjects have completed a philosophy course, the course they were participating in the survey for
(Philosophy or Psychology), the dilemma version (Self or Other), and dilemma order. For all of
the dilemmas, L1 was a significant predictor (p < 0.001) of moral responses when these factors
were controlled for, in addition to the predictive effects of L2 being controlled for. For 10 of the
16 dilemmas, L2 was a significant predictor (p < 0.05) of moral responses when the background
factors were controlled for, in addition to the predictive effects of E2 being controlled for. L2
was a significant predictor (p < 0.10) for 4 of the dilemmas, and non-significant for 2 dilemmas
(Secret Agent and Remote Waterfall). Also, for all of the 16 dilemmas, a composite likeliness
rating (the sum of a subject’s responses to L1 and L2) was a significant predictor (p < 0.001) of
moral responses when the background factors were controlled.

5.3 Discussion
There was no significant difference between subjects’ moral judgments in the Self and
Other conditions. The present study did not go far enough to ensure that the moral judgments
subjects made were representative of subjects’ moral intuitions, rather than moral beliefs that
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they formed inferentially or that they would easily give up; this is something that researchers of
moral psychology should focus on in future studies. However, on the assumption that the
judgments do indicate intuitions (an assumption proponents of the argument from cognitive
biases would endorse), we can say that there was no significant difference between subjects’
moral intuitions in the Self and Other conditions. That is, the present study suggests that there is
not a self-other cognitive bias in moral intuitions about personal moral dilemmas. Further
investigation will be required to determine if there is a self-other bias of moral intuitions at all,
and if so whether it is restricted to a bias of intuitions about impersonal dilemmas. Thus, contrary
to Nadelhoffer and Feltz, it is not clear that the self-other bias can offer much support for
premise C4a* of the argument from cognitive biases, which holds that moral intuitions are
sufficiently subject to cognitive biases to show that they are unreliable. If intuitions about
impersonal dilemmas are, in fact, subject to a self-other bias, while intuitions about personal
dilemmas are not, this would still create a lot of biased moral intuitions in the ‘moral intuition’
class of moral beliefs. But given the early nature of the evidence, the fact that impersonal
dilemmas have been shown to be affected by a self-other bias, while personal dilemmas have
not, suggests that further investigation is needed to assess whether or not, and to what extent
moral intuitions are affected by a self-other bias.
Nonetheless, as discussed in Section 2.3, there remain a variety of other cognitive biases
of moral intuitions about other dilemmas that are quite well established, and that can be used to
support C4a*. So I take it that the more important aspect of the present study is the high degree
of correlation between subjects’ moral intuitions and their non-moral judgments; non-moral
judgments were highly significant predictors of moral intuitions for each of the 16 dilemmas.
This finding is not interesting simply because it shows a link between subjects’ moral intuitions
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and non-moral judgments. Obviously the non-moral judgments we make about a case affect our
moral intuitions. When we judge someone to be shooting a gun in target practice, we do not
intuit it to be wrong, but when we judge someone to be shooting a gun at an innocent child, we
do intuit it to be wrong. Our different judgments of the non-moral facts about what the gun is
being shot at helps explain why we form different moral intuitions.
What is interesting here is instead that subjects’ non-moral judgments about how
believable they found the scenarios predict their moral intuitions. It seems that subjects’ moral
intuitions about the 16 moral dilemmas examined in the present study were not formed simply
based on the stipulated facts of the dilemmas—that is, on the stipulated likeliness of the
outcomes of performing or not performing the proposed actions (outcomes which were always
said to be what will happen). Rather, their moral intuitions were formed using their own
judgments about the likeliness of the outcomes, which differed across the scenarios. Thus, it is
likely that when responding to a moral dilemma like the ones taken to show biasing of moral
intuitions (from Section 2.3), subjects do not respond based on the stipulated facts of the case,
like the stipulated likeliness of the outcomes of the potential courses of action (e.g. “You can
throw the switch, saving the five innocent people, which will result in the death of the one
innocent person on the side track”; Petrinovich and O’Neil 1996). Rather, they respond based on
what they judge the likeliness of the outcomes to be, even when the scenario specifies what the
outcome will be. For example, in Underwater Hatch, when a subject judged that it is ‘not at all
likely’ that not chopping off the person’s arm will result in the room from flooding, she was
likely to judge that chopping off the person’s arm is wrong. It is clearly wrong to chop off the
person’s arm if that action is not necessary to prevent the room from flooding (i.e. if the room
will not flood—or if you do not think it is likely to flood—if you do not chop off his arm). The
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scenario stipulated that if you do not chop off his arm, then the room will flood; but subjects
varied in how probable they thought this stipulation was, and those who thought it was less
probable were more likely to judge chopping off the arm as wrong.
The ability to use non-moral judgments to predict moral intuitions supports the
intuitionist’s objection from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases of moral intuitions, which
rejects premise C4b* by arguing that cognitive biases of moral intuitions are grounded in biases
of non-moral intuitions. People’s non-moral judgments about the believability of moral
dilemmas predicts their moral responses—so it is possible that some of the cognitive biases of
moral intuitions used to support premise C4a* (discussed in section 2.3) are grounded in biasing
effects on subjects’ non-moral judgments, such as biases of judgments about the likeliness of the
stipulated outcomes of the dilemmas.
This is just one sort of non-moral judgment that might be affected by a cognitive bias,
leading to the biasing of moral intuitions. But there are many other non-moral judgments that
might be biased in the relevant dilemmas—like subjects’ beliefs about the facts of the case that
are not described in the short presentation of the dilemma (like the character traits of the other
people described in the dilemma, their health, the likely future consequences of the actions, and
so on). For example, Kuhn showed that people’s non-moral judgments about the probability of
certain events—probabilities which were unspecified in the descriptions of the scenarios—are
affected by framing effects (1997).
Admittedly, the present study has demonstrated only a correlation between moral
intuitions and non-moral judgments—so it does not directly support the intuitionist’s objection
from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases. This objection requires that the differences in a
person’s moral intuitions are caused by the differences in her non-moral judgments. But the
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correlation between moral and non-moral judgments could be explained by saying that the
differences in non-moral judgments are caused by differences in moral intuitions. For example,
moral and non-moral judgments might be correlated because subjects adjust their non-moral
judgments in a way to rationalize their moral intuitions. In the Underwater Hatch dilemma, a
subject might say that chopping off the trapped person’s arm is wrong, and then rationalize that
judgment by saying that it is ‘not at all likely’ that (i) the room will flood if she does not chop off
his arm, and that (ii) the room will not flood if she does chop off his arm. That is, after saying it
is wrong to chop off the person’s arm, she might rationalize that judgment by saying that not
chopping of the person’s arm wont result in the room flooding, and that chopping the person’s
arm off wont prevent the room from flooding—making it obviously wrong to chop off the
person’s arm, since doing so has no beneficial consequences. She rationalizes her judgment by
thinking that the room will flood or not flood regardless of whether or not she chops off the
person’s arm.
However, I think there is good reason to think that the causal arrow goes the other way,
with the differences in non-moral judgments causing the differences in moral intuitions. As
discussed in Section 4.2, it seems likely that part of ordinary moral psychology is the thesis of
moral supervenience, which holds that if two cases do not differ in their non-moral properties,
then they do not differ in their non-moral properties. And this would suggest that within-subject
differences in moral intuitions (which would include cognitive biases of intuitions) should be
grounded in within-subject differences in non-moral judgments; given the thesis of moral
supervenience, a given subject would not have different moral intuitions about two cases unless
she made different non-moral judgments about them. Thus, the fact that subjects’ non-moral,
epistemic judgments are significant predictors of their moral intuitions provides is best explained
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by the non-moral judgments playing a causal role in the formation of subjects’ moral intuitions.
This makes it seem very likely that many cognitive biases of subjects’ moral intuitions are
grounded in biases of their non-moral intuitions; that is, premise C4b* of the argument from
cognitive biases is plausibly false, and the argument fails to go through.
There are a variety of limitations to the present study that should make us cautious in
interpreting the results. Most importantly, the claim that ordinary moral psychology includes the
thesis of moral supervenience is an empirical claim that to my knowledge has not been
evaluated. It seems likely to be vindicated, but without such vindication at present my claim that
the differences in non-moral, epistemic judgments causally contribute to differences in moral
intuitions is largely speculative and should be understood as such. Also, as already mentioned,
this research has failed to address the difference between moral beliefs and moral intuitions; the
moral judgments subjects make might represent moral intuitions (qua strongly held, noninferentially formed moral beliefs), or they might represent mere moral beliefs that subjects
would easily give up.
6 Conclusions
To conclude, I have attempted to show the parallel between Sinnott-Armstrong’s recent
argument from cognitive biases and the well-known argument from disagreement. Because of
this tight parallel, the argument from cognitive biases is subject to an objection that is often
levied against the argument from disagreement; many of the cognitive biases cited to show that
moral intuitions are unreliable are not genuine, they are derived. That is, the cognitive biases of
moral intuitions are grounded in biases of non-moral intuitions. And derived biases of moral
intuitions, like derived moral disagreements, can be resolved by resolving the relevant non-moral
biases, which would remove the unreliability of moral intuitions without making them inferable.
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Since that unreliability was the reason moral intuitions required inferential justification in the
first place, when it is removed without making moral intuitions inferable, those intuitions can be
justified non-inferentially. Thus, derived cognitive biases would not threaten a moderate moral
intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be justified under ideal conditions. There may
be reasons why moral intuitions cannot be justified, inferentially or non-inferentially, but
cognitive biases are not among of them, contrary to the claims of proponents of the argument
from cognitive biases (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008a, 2008b; Nadelhoffer and Feltz in prep.;
Vayrynen forthcoming).
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Appendices
Appendix A: Regression Statistics
The dependent variable was subjects’ moral responses. You can read the text of the scenarios in
Appendix B. The following were controlled for (and were entered in the regression equation in
this order): gender, whether the subjects have completed a philosophy course, the course they
were participating in the survey for (Philosophy or Psychology), the dilemma version (Self or
Other), and dilemma order. After these factors were partialed out, the predictor variable was
entered, and the data below represents the change in the regression model’s ability to predict the
dependent variable when the predictor was added. E1 is the first non-moral question (asking “If
you do NOT X, how likely is it that Y?”). E2 is the second non-moral questions (asking “If you
DO X, how likely is it that Y?”). E Composite is the sum of a subject’s responses to E1 and E2,
and represents an overall non-moral judgment of the believability of the scenario; that is, a nonmoral judgment about the believability of the outcomes that are stipulated in the scenario.
*significant at p = 0.05 **significant at p = 0.01 ***significant at p = 0.001
F ratio
p value
Dilemma
Predictor
ΔR2
(for ΔR2)
Secret Agent
E1
0.036
7.167
0.008**
E2
0.005
0.961
0.328
E Composite
0.42
8.391
0.004**
Underwater Hatch
E1
0.149
34.836
0.000***
E2
0.015
3.582
0.060
E Composite
.0201
45.378
0.000***
Remote Waterfall
E1
0.175
42.985
0.000***
E2
0.010
2.412
0.122
E Composite
0.194
45.599
0.000***
Hospital Worker
E1
0.164
36.557
0.000***
E2
0.015
3.432
0.066
E Composite
0.155
33.240
0.000***
Sniper
E1
0.102
23.206
0.000***
E2
0.038
8.630
0.004**
E Composite
0.177
40.053
0.000***
Antidote
E1
0.065
13.999
0.000***
E2
0.018
3.919
0.049*
E Composite
0.108
23.320
0.000***
Space Shuttle
E1
0.107
25.101
0.000***
E2
0.023
5.297
0.023*
E Composite
0.182
42.146
0.000***
Desert Burial
E1
0.144
32.998
0.000***
E2
0.014
3.296
0.071
E Composite
0.156
34.497
0.000***
Bunker
E1
0.111
22.095
0.000***
E2
0.045
9.082
0.003**
E Composite
0.133
26.451
0.000***
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Hot Air Balloon
Firefighter Bucket
Agonizing Choice
Seaside Cave
Crying Baby
Mountain Climbing
Mine

E1
E2
E Composite
E1
E2
E Composite
E1
E2
E Composite
E1
E2
E Composite
E1
E2
E Composite
E1
E2
E Composite
E1
E2
E Composite

0.120
0.044
0.233
0.066
0.019
0.101
0.067
0.086
0.156
0.140
0.021
0.154
0.090
0.068
0.170
0.106
0.030
0.156
0.043
0.022
0.112

29.690
10.979
57.643
12.062
3.393
18.370
13.039
16.872
30.750
30.769
4.593
32.520
17.920
13.619
34.114
21.299
5.974
31.291
7.866
4.113
20.766

0.000***
0.001**
0.000***
0.001***
0.067
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.034*
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.016*
0.000***
0.006**
0.044*
0.000***

Appendix B: Moral Dilemmas
Survey 1
Secret agent (Self version)
You are a government agent who has been captured by the enemy. They want you to give
them the code to access information on the location of a bomb. If you do give them the code, the
enemy will gain access to a bomb which they will use to blow up a government building,
resulting in hundreds of deaths.
If you do not give them the code, they will torture an unknown four-year-old child to
death right before your eyes.
Underwater Hatch (Other version)
You work in an underwater research facility. There has been an explosion and water is
pouring into the facility, causing all of the doors to begin closing automatically. You, the facility
director, and five other researchers are in a room that is being sealed off by a closing door. At the
last minute, someone in the hall tries to make it to safety in the room by sliding under the closing
door, but he is too late and the door closes on his arm, trapping him outside and making it
impossible for him to get into the room. This also prevents the door from closing and allows
water to rush into the room.
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If nothing is done, the water will flood the room and drown you and everyone else inside,
including the person trapped under the door. The only way to save you and the other researchers
is for the facility director to chop the trapped person’s arm off with an axe, leaving him out in the
hallway where he will drown, allowing the door to close and preventing the room from flooding.
Remote waterfall (Self version)
John, you, and your four children are hiking alongside a tropical river on your way to
explore a remote waterfall. You have accidentally walked across a local river tribe’s sacred ritual
site.
For this offence, tribal law says that all of you must be put to death. However, the leader
of the tribe has decided that he will let John, you, and your three oldest children live if you
yourself will sacrifice your youngest child by drowning her in a sacred river ceremony.
Hospital Worker (Other version)
Your son is a patient in the hospital who needs an organ transplant. He and four other
patients will soon die, each due to a different failing organ because there are no organs available
to save them. There is another patient in the hospital who is in a coma on life support and her
doctors agree that she will never wake up.
The only way that your son and the four other dying patients will live is if Fred, who
works in the hospital, pulls the plug on the comatose patient’s life support machine, killing her so
that her organs will be available for transplanting. If Fred does this, then the comatose patient
will die and your dying son and the four other dying patients will receive their transplants and
will be able to live.
Sniper (Other version)
Tom is the sniper in a police SWAT team which is positioned outside of the office
building where your daughter works. A terrorist has taken twenty people, including your
daughter, hostage inside the building and is about to detonate a bomb, which would blow up the
building, killing all of the hostages.
The only way to prevent the terrorist from blowing up the office building is for Tom to
shoot him dead before he can detonate the bomb. The terrorist is protecting himself by holding
your daughter hostage in front of him so that Tom must shoot and kill her in order to kill the
terrorist.
Antidote (Self version)
You are a scientist working in a small mountain village. A deadly substance has
contaminated the local water supply and villagers are starting to get sick. Soon hundreds of
villagers will be dead, including you. You have just created an antidote for this deadly substance,
but have only one vial. You are taking the vial to your lab, where you can replicate the antidote
and save yourself and the other villagers.
On your way to the lab you come across a villager who has already become very sick and
will die if he does not immediately get the antidote. If you give this man the antidote, he will
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survive and you will have no antidote left to replicate. As a result, there would be no way to save
yourself and the other villagers.
Space shuttle (Other version)
You and your son are astronauts onboard a space shuttle that is about to return from a
visit to the moon. An explosion has caused the shuttle to lose most of its fuel supply. Even after
dumping as much weight as possible off of the shuttle, there is still not enough fuel for the
shuttle to make it back from the moon. If the shuttle does not get back soon it will run out of
fuel, and everyone on board will die, including you, your son, and the other four astronauts.
One of the astronauts has become seriously ill and will not survive no matter what. If the
captain of the shuttle dumps this fatally ill astronaut into outer space, there will be just enough
fuel and the shuttle will carry the captain, you, your son, and the other two astronauts back from
the moon safely.
Desert burial (Self version)
You are a tour guide and are taking your two children to visit ancient ruins in the middle
of the desert. You and your children have accidentally wandered into an off-limits tomb
belonging to a local clan.
The clan’s law says that any children who are found in the off-limits tomb must be put to
death. However, the elders of the clan have taken a liking to your children and have decided that
they will let them live if you yourself will sacrifice a young child from the clan by burying her
alive.
Survey 2
Bunker (Other version)
Joe is a military commander stationed in a sealed bunker deep underground. One of his
soldiers contracted a deadly virus before entering the bunker, which is now sealed and cannot be
opened. Joe is the only person in the bunker who has been vaccinated against this virus. If the
infected soldier continues breathing the virus into the air then it will spread quickly, killing the
other twenty soldiers in the bunker, except for Joe.
In order to prevent the deadly virus from spreading, Joe must shoot dead the infected
soldier, which will stop him from breathing the virus into the air.
Hot air balloon (Self version)
You are a hot air balloon pilot flying a group of ten sightseers high in the air on a hot air
balloon ride. You realize that the balloon is carrying more people than it was designed to carry
and is beginning to strain under the weight. The balloon will soon fall sending you and the
sightseers plummeting to the ground, killing you all.
If nothing is done, the balloon will crash and you and everyone else on board will fall to
your deaths. However, you know that there is an elderly woman on board who will die from a
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terminal illness within a week. If you throw that woman off of the hot air balloon, the balloon
will not fall and you and the other eight sightseers will make it down to the ground safely.
Firefighter Bucket (Other version)
A firefighter has just rescued you, your child, and your two neighbors from the 15th floor
of your burning apartment building. He has deposited the four of you at the top of his fire truck’s
ladder, which is lowering you down to safety. There is too much weight on the ladder, and it
begins to break.
If nothing is done, the ladder will break, and you, your child, and your neighbors will fall
15 stories and be instantly killed. If your one neighbor pushes your other neighbor, who happens
to be very large, off of the ladder, this will prevent the ladder from breaking so that you, your
child, and your one neighbor can be brought down safely.
Agonizing choice (Self version)
You and your three children are inmates in a concentration camp. Your youngest child
has tried to escape from the camp. To make an example of her a guard is going to hang her in the
middle of the camp.
He has stood her up on a chair and put a noose around her neck. The guard has told you
to hang her by pulling the chair out from underneath her feet, causing her to fall and be strangled
to death. If you do not hang her, the guard has decided he will personally hang her and your two
other children.
Seaside Cave (Self version)
You are a geologist who is exploring a tiny cave on a secluded coastline with a group of
ten of your colleagues. You are the first person to exit the cave, and the person behind you gets
stuck in the entrance, trapping the rest of the group inside the cave. In a short time high tide will
be upon the cave.
The person cannot be pulled from the cave entrance no matter how hard you try, and
unless he is unstuck, he and the rest of the group, except for you, will drown. You have brought
with you a stick of dynamite. If you use the dynamite to blow the person from the entrance, the
person will be blown to pieces and the other geologists will be able to escape the cave safely.
Since you are already outside of the cave, you will be safe no matter what.
Crying baby 2 (Other version)
Your apartment building has just been taken over by a local militia. They have orders to
kill anyone they find inside. When the militia took over, you were painting your kitchen while
your neighbor Judy watched your baby. Judy (who is holding your baby) and eight other
neighbors have taken cover in a dark hidden attic. You made it to the attic just in time to hide,
and outside you hear the militia searching the apartment for valuables.
Your baby begins to cry loudly. Judy covers his mouth to block the sound. If she removes
her hand from his mouth his crying will get the attention of the militia, who will kill Judy, your
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baby, you and the others hiding in the attic. If Judy is to save herself, you, and the other
neighbors, she must continue covering your baby’s mouth until she smothers him to death.
Mountain Climbing (Self version)
You are leading a climbing expedition, which includes your son, up a frozen
mountaintop. A climber attached to the same rope as you, your son, and another person is falling
off the side of a cliff, but you grab her hand as she falls.
The weight of the fallen climber begins to drag you, your son, and the other person off of
the cliff. If you do nothing, the three of you will be pulled over the cliff by the fallen climber and
you will all plummet to your deaths. The only way for you to save yourself, your son, and the
other person is to let go of the fallen climber’s hand, dropping her to her death.
Mine 2 (Other version)
Your grown-up children work in a small underground mine. A dam near the mine has
burst, sending water rushing toward the mine. If nothing is done, the water will flood the section
of the mine where your children and eight other miners are working, causing them all to drown.
The mine manager is safe in his office, and the only way for him to avoid the deaths of
your children and the other miners working in the mine is to radio a worker who is safe outside
the mine and order her to seal off the mine from the outside. If the manager does this, the worker
will not be able to get to safety before the water comes and she will be swept away just outside
the mine and killed.

